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“It’s well past time to challenge the power of today’s global capital – before it does any more damage to 
the lives of working people. Before it succeeds completely in putting a 21
st
 Century face on the Robber 
Baron values of yesteryear 
 
Globalization is the driving force behind this New Age of Robber Barons.  
 
It has revolutionized the way business is done – and the way workers’ aspirations are dealt with – if dealt 
with at all. 
 
The growing power of global corporations is all around us. We see it in the glut of corporate buyouts in 
every industry from aluminum to mining, from paper to steel, and many more. 
 
But there’s a revolution happening right under our noses that’s not so easy to see: 
 
I’m talking about the growth of finance as the dominant economic force in industrial societies like ours. 
Today, finance rules the world. Today, finances’ share of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product is twice as 
much as manufacturing. 
 
And finances’ share of corporate profits is nearly five times as great as manufacturing. 
As a result, today’s Robber Barons of Bay Street and Wall Street are reaping billions through reckless 
financing schemes… 
 
While working people keep getting pushed farther and farther down the economic food chain. 
They’ve done it by deregulating everything from finance to labour law and creating one Ponzi scheme 
after another. 
 
We’re not only being challenged by employers who want to .......rob us of our pensions. 
 
Sisters and brothers, seize this moment to rekindle the hope we have for a better future. Our kids and 
grand kids, our families, our communities and our planet are all counting on us,  
 
Sister and brothers, their hopes and dreams are a cause worth fighting for. We must not falter. We must 
not fail.  
 
Seize the moment – now is the time! NOW IS OUR TIME” 
 
(Leo W. Gerard
i
 Keynote Address, "Seize the Moment - This Is Our Time!‖ June 30, 2008) 
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Abstract 
South African pension fund assets are estimated at ZAR 1 924 billion. This is a large pool of funds that 
is collected from workers. However, the contention is that workers, whose savings make up the assets of 
pension funds have little influence on how these funds are used. As a result, most of the funds are 
invested in corporations, which do not reflect the aspirations of the labour movement.  The argument is 
that if these funds were under the control and direction of the working class, enormous contributions 
would be made towards economic growth, socially useful investments, community development, 
employment creation and growth in retirement benefits. The purpose of this study was to assess the 
extent to which trade unions have been able to promote the interest of members and direct pension fund 
investment in sectors that will have a positive impact on working families and their communities in 
South Africa. This study adopted a qualitative method, using purposive sampling and a semi-structured 
outline to conduct face-to-face interviews with union unions and fund managers. Collected data were 
analyzed using content analysis. Results were categorized into two distinct parts. The first part looked at 
pension fund investment regulation and management, asset allocation, investment practices and 
composition of the pension board. The second part described trade unions‘ role in promoting the interest 
of pension fund members; the extent of their influence in pension fund investments; their contribution to 
strengthening pension fund governance and how to enhance their influence and control of pension fund 
investments. The study suggests that trade unions have a critical role to play in pension fund 
management through their representation on the pension boards. However, the success can only be 
achieved if trade unions have a clear policy that spells out labour‘s agenda on pension issues. 
Additionally, union trustees should be supported to getting involved in understanding their plans and 
develop capacities in capital market strategies, investment and economic development.  
11 
 
Chapter One – Introduction to the study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The South African pension industry controls a large pool of funds that are collected from 
workers‘ earnings. In 2008, the total assets of the retirement fund industry were estimated at R1 
924 billion. This was 0.7 percent decrease from R1 938 billion in 2007. The net assets of 
privately administered funds decreased by 5.4 percent, from R950 billion in 2007 to R898 billion 
in 2008, even though the total contributions received by retirement funds increased by 8.6 
percent, from R91.1 billion in 2007 to R99 billion in 2008 (Registrar of Pension Funds, Annual 
Report 2010). These funds provide a major source of investment capital in the South African 
economy and own substantial stakes in a number of companies (COSATU, 1997). 
 
The pension fund industry is presently dominated by the private sector, making business‘ agenda 
more dominant (Pillay, 2003).  Most of the funds are invested in corporations, which do not 
reflect the aspirations of the labour movement. Therefore, workers, whose savings make up the 
assets of pension funds remain silent regarding the behaviour and practices of the companies that 
they own shares in.  The net effect of this situation is passive ownership (NALEDI Policy 
Bulletin, August 2002).  
 
According to Naidoo (2003), the South African economy suffers from insufficient investment in 
productive activities (from 25 percent of GDP in 1981 to 14.7 percent in 2001). He attributes this 
12 
 
low level of investment to the massive outflow of capital. If pension funds were under the 
control and direction of the working class, enormous contributions would be made towards 
economic growth, socially useful investments, community development, employment creation 
and growth in retirement benefits (COSATU, 1999).   
 
Experiences of trade unions in Canada and the United States have shown the important gains 
resulting from involvement in pension fund investment management. In particular, they have 
been able to achieve reforms of corporate governance; ensure that companies recognise their 
social responsibilities; and direct capital to areas of the economy that traditional institutional 
investment have failed to serve properly (Trade Union Congress, 2003). However, with respect 
to how the funds are invested in South Africa, it is not clear as to what extent the labour 
movement has been able to protect these ―deferred wages‖ and influence investments in 
generating real productive activities and jobs.   
 
This is a case study of three South African trade union, that is National Union of Mines (NUM), 
National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) and National Education, Health 
Workers Union (NEHAWU) to try to investigate the extent to which they have been able to 
protect the interest of members and the broader social interest of the labour movement such as 
strengthening corporate governance in the pension industry; and to use enterprises‘ profits in the 
social sector for the benefit of workers and communities. 
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1.2 Background to the Study 
 
The background to the study is motivated along the framework of Fung, Hebb and Rogers who 
argue that the traditional role of trade unions of only bargaining for labour rights is rapidly 
changing to include issues related to workers‘ strategy for capital (Fung, Hebb and Rogers, 
2001). In light of this, Wheeler (2002) identifies a number of strategies involving the power of 
workers‘ capital that are currently being pursued by some trade unions in North America and 
Western Europe.  Firstly, producer cooperatives that promote the principle of worker ownership 
of the means of production. According to Wheeler, ―the fundamental logic of cooperatives turns 
capitalism on its head‖ (2002: 7), as labour will hire capital and not the other way round.  The 
rationale behind idea of cooperatives is to ensure that there is an equal distribution of workers 
output among themselves (Wheeler 2002). 
 
Secondly, worker ownership in shares of their own company. In many employee-owned 
companies employee shareholders have opportunities to influence the policies of their employer, 
especially in the area of corporate governance (Wheeler, 2002). According to Piñera ―the world 
would be a better place if every worker were also an owner of capital‖ (2001: 1). Since their 
interests ―would be more in line with the interests of those who manage and control those assets, 
there would be less inequality of wealth, and workers would place a higher value on strong 
property rights and the rule of law‖ (Pinera, 2001: 1). Third, union funds for economic 
development – this strategy is about putting unions‘ funds together for economic development.  
These funds are part of employees‘ retirement funds that are mobilized to establish the worker 
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owned enterprises (Wheeler, 2002: 11).  Fourth, influence through worker pensions funds. Trade 
unions have been using the power of workers pension to influence corporate policy by 
encouraging worker pension funds to engage in social responsible investments (Wheeler, 2002: 
10). 
 
These four workers‘ capital strategies highlight future areas of growth for the revitalization of the 
labour movement. The focus of this study was on how the trade union movement in South Africa 
has been able to use pension fund capital in shaping the economy to the benefit of the workers 
and their communities. According to Croft and  Hebb, ―this shift in the labour movement to 
become stronger stewards of its retirement assets has come at a critical time, within the 
gravitational pull of the progressive new role of the labour movement‖ (2002: 6) in the 
globalised world.  Bennett and Johnson argue that 
 
Those who control pension fund assets already wield a tremendous economic 
power which is rapidly increasing. The allocation of fund assets will greatly 
influence the direction of economic activity in the years to come; union control of 
such economic power would greatly enhance the ability of labour unions to 
achieve their economic and political objectives (1981: 187). 
 
A  similar  conclusion  is  reached  by an Ontario Public Service Employees' Union (OPSEU)  
policy paper on pension with respect to union appointed trustees and sponsors for jointly trusted 
plans: 
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Where there is no union control of the pension fund, unions are defenceless in 
 preventing their members‘ deferred wages from being used against their 
 interests and, ultimately, the  interest of the pension fund itself  (OPSEU, 
 2002: 7).    
 
Whatever  the   specific  constraints  and  motives,  it   appears  that  fundamental  changes  have  
occurred  in the management of pension funds. Consequently, monopolistic control of pension 
plans by employers has given way to joint trusteeship in most of the funds; investment practices 
that seemed to serve only the interest of employers and whose returns were well below markets 
rates have equally been challenged. The argument is that these investments practices did not 
provide a sustainable fund in the long-run (OPSEU, 2002).  Therefore, union representation on 
pension board of trustees will to some extent protect pensions against the ―practices that caused 
the chronic underfunding of retirement benefits such as contribution holidays, borrowing from 
the pension fund at low interest‖ (Verma and Weststar, 2011). Additionally, there is greater role 
for pension funds in bringing about broader social benefits by sustainably investing in workers 
and their communities through alternative investment such as the socially responsible investment 
and economically targeted investment (Verma and Weststar, 2011). 
 
In South Africa, the idea of empowering the working class has been at the centre of the struggle 
of the trade union movement, given the legacy of apartheid.  However, COSATU has become 
critical of government‘s black economic empowerment (BEE) strategy and the implementation 
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of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. The contention is that GEAR 
―was an inappropriate growth model for the South African economy‖, as it ―focused not on the 
interests of the majority, but on the selfish short-term interests of certain sections of business‖ 
(Southall, n.d: 1) and that ―the pursuit of BEE should be located in a much more extensively 
transformative programme of worker and popular empowerment‖ (Southall, n.d: 2).  
 
The control of pension funds, therefore, presents an opportunity for unions to change the current 
economic configuration in South Africa. With regard to the unions exerting influence over 
pension funds, however, the legislation requiring at least 50 percent worker representation on the 
board of trustees has been secured.  This provides labour trustees with an opportunity to exert 
active influence over the companies in which the retirement funds are invested, with the aim of 
investing in activities that provide workers with ―collateral benefits‖ such as ―jobs, affordable 
housing, local development, the promotion of local businesses, and a range of other economic 
and social priorities‖ (Carmichael and Quarter, 2003: 10). 
 
1.3 Statement of the Research Problem 
 
The  problem  being investigated  in  the  present  study  is  how  trade unions have been able to 
promote the interest of  pension fund members and the broader social interest of the labour 
movement such as social investments and the promotion of human and labour rights.  Spelled  
out  in the  amendments to the Pensions Fund Act in 1996, members of retirement funds have the 
right to elect representatives onto the boards of their respective funds. With worker elected 
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representative comprising least 50 percent of the board of trustees, it is argued that they will be 
able to protect the entitlements of future pensioners and guarantee adequacy of benefits (Gifford, 
2004). 
 
If  it  is  indeed  the  case  that trade union participation in pension fund investment  do  enhance  
sound investment policies,  it is expected  that pension fund members would receive good 
retirement incomes and living in a clean, safe and secure world. The  study  asks  whether  
indeed  the  participation of labour trustees on the pension fund boards in South Africa  has  
made  the  unions‘  role  effective  and  relevant in the management of pension funds. 
Accordingly,  the  research  problem  is  formulated  as  follows:  investigate the extent to which 
trade unions have been able to promote the interest of members and direct pension fund 
investments in sectors that would contribute to the betterment of working families and their 
communities in South Africa,  and  thus  understand  what  would  constitute  sustainable  
strategies  for  the   trade  unions  in  future. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The main purpose of the study is to assess the extent to which trade unions have been able to 
promote the interest of members through pension fund investment management in South Africa 
so as to recommend ways of enhancing their influence that will have a positive impact on 
working families and their communities. More  specifically,  this  study  intends  to  answer  the  
following  questions; 
18 
 
 
i) To what extent have trade unions been able to promote the interest of members and direct 
pension fund investments in sectors that contribute to the betterment of working families 
and communities in South Africa? 
 
ii) What contributions have trade unions made in strengthening corporate governance in 
South Africa?  
 
iii) What strategies would enhance trade union influence and control of pension fund 
 investments in future?  
 
1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study 
 
While some  partial  studies on developed  countries have generally recognized that unions have 
gained greater control of the investment of pension funds; and are on the verge of developing 
more innovative investment approaches with goals of job creation, community development, 
corporate governance and long-term view of value (see for instance: Carmichael, 2003 and 
2005), very  little is known about  the extent to which trade unions have been able to promote the 
interest of members and influence pension fund investment in social sector for the benefit of 
their families and communities in South Africa. This study, therefore, responds to a felt need. 
Firstly, it fills the knowledge gap in the existing literature on trade unions and pension fund 
management in South Africa. Second, it attempts  to suggest  strategies  for  appropriate  trade  
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union  responses,  and  thirdly, it  provides  a  basis  for  further research  in  this  direction  as  it  
is  consistent  with  a  global  revival  of  interest  in  the  role of trade  unions in a global  era.   
 
1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study 
 
A comprehensive study into pension fund investment and  trade  unions  is  a  mammoth  task  
requiring  time  and  resources  beyond  what  is  currently  available.  This  study  is  restricted  
to  analyzing  aspects  of  pension fund investment  that  have  a  direct   bearing  on  trade  
unions.  The main limitations was that,  even  though  the  study  is  on  trade unions in South 
Africa,  it  is  focusing on three trade unions,  introducing  a  practical  difficulty of generalizing 
of the findings.  Even  with  this limitation,  however,  the  study  offers  some  very  useful  
insights  into  the  phenomenon  of  pension fund investment  and the role of trade  unions  that  
can  inform  critical debates  on  the  subject   as  well  as  advise   sustainable  strategies  for  
trade  unions  in  the  future. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Study  
 
This introductory chapter has flagged-off  key  themes  explored  in  the  study  and  has  outlined  
the  research  problem  and  objectives  motivating  the  study.  Chapter  2  presents  theoretical  
and  empirical  literature  on  pension fund investment and  the role of trade  unions.  The third 
chapter looks at the methodology used in answering the research question. In  chapter  4,  the  
characteristic of the pension industry in South Africa is presented  and  the  change  in  structure, 
20 
 
management and governance issues  over  the  last  decade  examined.  Chapter  5  presents  data  
on   the  role of trade  unions  in pension fund investment management and explores  the  
question  of  the extent to which trade  unions  are  able to promote and protect the interest of the 
members and direct pension fund investments in sectors that contribute to the betterment of 
working families and communities  in  South Africa.  Chapter  6  synthesizes  the  findings  of  
the  study   in  relation  to  the  research  questions  and  links  the  results  to  the  conceptual  
and   analytical  infrastructure  discussed  in  chapter  two. It also proposes sustainable strategies 
for trade unions in the future. Chapter 7 is a summation of the study. 
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Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical literature on pension fund investment 
management and the role of trade unions. It is organized into five main sections. Section 2 
provides an overview of pension funds, paying attention to the growth of assets; and their 
importance in the financial market. The third section looks at the investment of pension funds. 
The motivation is to provide an analysis of pension fund investment practices and their impact 
on the working population (as owners of capital) and society. Section 4 will focus on pension 
fund governance. This is to give the reader an understanding of the general principles of good 
governance with the focus on accountability, transparency and socially responsible investment, 
and understanding why this is critical to the trade unions and other stakeholders in the global era. 
The fourth section will describe the role of trade unions in pension fund management with a 
focus on the challenges facing trustee in influencing pension fund investment management. 
Section 5 will point out key issues from the literature reviewed and their implications for the 
study.  
 
2.2 Overview of pension funds 
 
Simply defined, pension funds are savings of workers that will provide them with an income 
replacement upon retirement. As a form of institutional investment, these collected funds are 
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invested to provide for the future pension entitlements to beneficiaries (Davis, 1995; OPSEU
ii
 
Policy Statement 2002). According to Davis (1995), pension funds provide means for individuals 
to accumulate saving over their working life so as to finance their consumption needs in 
retirement. In other words, they are deferred wages that employed workers earn while they are 
working but are paid upon retirement (OPSEU Policy Statement (2002.): 4). In addition to 
supplying income upon retirement, pension funds have been a source of capital for corporations, 
governments for investment or consumption and households at both national and international 
level. 
 
One important point to note is the rapid growth in pension fund assets over the past decade 
(Simpson, 2001). For example, the figures from OECD members show that the financial assets 
of pension funds have grown from US$5.9 trillion in 1994 to US$15.6 trillion by 2004 and 
further to US$ 18.7 trillion in 2007, before the financial crisis (OECD Observer 2004; OECD 
2010). Similarly, the Global Pension Asset Study 2010 shows that global pension fund assets 
have increased to over US$23 trillion in 2009. These assets amount to 70 percent of the average 
global GDP (Towers Watson, 2010).  Table 1 below illustrates the pension fund assets as a share 
of GDP in selected countries for the period 2001 – 2009. 
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Table 1:  Pension Fund Assets as a Share of GDP in selected countries 2001 - 2009 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Australia 75.29 70.42 68.87 71.59 80.38 90.40 110.36 93.01 82.26 
Canada 52.48 48.30 51.59 53.92 58.15 63.36 62.33 51.43 62.93 
Chile .. 55.07 58.16 59.08 59.35 61.01 64.43 52.77 65.12 
Denmark 27.19 26.01 28.48 30.76 33.71 32.43 32.36 47.55 43.26 
Finland 49.48 49.18 53.86 61.84 68.61 71.33 71.05 60.56 76.77 
Iceland 83.97 83.90 98.26 106.60 119.58 129.73 133.97 114.05 118.30 
Ireland 43.74 34.41 39.77 41.98 48.26 50.22 46.62 34.14 44.15 
Netherlands 102.62 85.50 101.19 108.12 121.73 125.74 138.05 112.72 129.86 
Switzerland 102.46 95.92 102.87 107.24 117.03 119.97 119.18 101.15 .. 
United Kingdom 72.00 58.77 64.35 67.61 78.63 83.43 78.91 64.30 .. 
United States 71.52 63.21 72.57 74.01 74.84 79.33 79.41 57.93 67.70 
Source: OECD Stat, 2010  
 
The growth in pension funds as observed above can be attributed to the growth of assets in many 
advanced markets (US and Japan, together account for more than 70 percent of total assets) 
(Tower Watson, 2010). Another observable trend over this period is the growing importance of 
equity investment within the portfolios of pension fund investors (Simpson, 2001). For instance, 
for over 20 years, the funds allocation to equity stayed close to the 30 percent mark. By 1998 the 
allocation had moved towards 50 percent of portfolio (Simpson, 2001). With these trends, it is no 
doubt that pension funds are becoming the leading owners of equity in many markets. 
 
Some commentators contend that workers, whose deferred wages make up the assets of pension 
funds, and their unions, have little say in the management of pension funds and investment 
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strategies (OPSEU Policy statement, 2002). Instead, they are controlled by a ―pension industry 
complex‖, which is made up of ―fund managers, employer intermediaries, consultants and 
advisors, lawyers and actuaries‖ (Croft and Hebb, 2002: 14). In other words, ―an intricate web of 
financial and legal standards such as fiduciary responsibility‖ (OPSEU Policy statement, 2002: 
3). Clark (2000) provides an insight into the evolving nature of pension funds and the role they 
play in today‘s financial system. He points out that, the current stage of capitalism is dominated 
by pension funds who represent broad share ownership, but who are in fact single industry 
players whose very presence in the market dwarfs and dominates the financial system. 
 
Stafford (1987), asserts that those who control pension fund assets already wield a tremendous 
economic power, which is still increasing rapidly. He stressed that the allocation of fund assets 
will greatly influence the direction of economic activity in the years to come. It is clear that to 
control pension funds is to have power over large sums of money flows (Hayden, 1989: 1032). 
As suggested by Bennett and Johnson (1981), unions' ability to command such economic power 
would greatly enhance their ability to achieve their economic and political objectives. 
 
Stafford (1987), explains that how such a large amount of what is called "deferred wages" came 
to be in the hands of capital and used to further its interest is very important to labour. According 
to Stafford, these funds have been used in developing new technologies, which have been 
replacing workers. He points out that the funds are used to finance the movement of capital into 
regions of lower wage rates, causing the displacement of workers in established industrial 
regions. This observation in the function of pension funds suggests that labour's wages are being 
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used against their interests (Stafford 1987). Therefore, how these funds are invested is very 
important to the labour movement.  
 
2.3 Investment of pension funds 
 
As pension funds increase in size, most financial institutions have hired fund managers to 
manage the investments (Stafford, 1987). As a highly competitive business, a large number of 
firms are fighting for contracts to manage these portfolios (Crotty, 2004: 12) According to 
Stafford, this has put great pressure on fund managers, creating conditions under which they are 
now directing funds into riskier operations in the hope of gaining higher returns and thus 
retaining their contracts and attracting more clients (Stafford, 1987).  
 
According to Chandrasekhar, increasing financial liberalization following neoliberal era brought 
significant transformation in the financial market in the 1980s (Chandrasekhar, 2007). This has 
been necessitated by globalization, that is,  ―a process that seeks to create a single global market 
operating according to universal rules driven primarily by the needs of multinational 
corporations‖ (Naidoo, 2002: 1), including financial industry.  For Naidoo, it is important for 
labour to discuss the economic dimension of globalization they embark on advocating employee 
ownership, which include control of pension funds. He argued that economic dimension has the 
―biggest impact on levels of poverty and on the ability of the poor to influence economic 
changes‖ (Naidoo, 2002: 1). 
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Chandrasekhar (2007) pointed out that there is an increasing desire by pension funds and 
financial investors to find new avenues for their growing resources. Citing OECD reports of 
2001 and 2003, Chandrasekhar demonstrates  an increase in pension fund in the US from US$ 
786 billion in 1980 to US$ 1.8 trillion in 1985, US$ 2.7 trillion in 1990, US$ 4.8 trillion in 1995, 
US$ 7.4 trillion in 2000 and US$ 8 trillion in 2004 (Chandrasekhar, 2007: 2). According 
Chandrasekhar, resources of this magnitude accumulating at this rate forces financial investors to 
seek new areas if investment that would give them adequate returns to meet their obligations 
(2007: 2). For instance, as Politi and Guerrera (2006), cited in Chandrasekhar (2007: 2), point 
out, pension funds‘ exposure to private equity (PE) has increased over the decade averaging 8 
percent of their funds in this asset class.  
 
The other significant development has been related to the relaxation of rules and regulations 
relating to investments that could be undertaken by institutional investors. For instance, the 
Competition and Credit Control policy in the UK and the amendment to the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 in the US relaxed the limitations placed on institutional 
investors and gave them greater investment flexibility (Chandrasekhar, 2007: 3; Lazonick and 
O‘Sullivan, 2000: 17). As a result, there was an increase in demand for other risky securities like 
―junk‖ bonds created by Michael Milken at Drexel, Burnham, Lambert that would deliver quick 
results (Crotty, 2004: 11; Lazonick and O‘Sullivan, 2000: 17). According to Crotty, this became 
―a viable source of debt finance for virtually any hostile takeover, even of long-established giant 
firms‖ (Crotty, 2004: 11).  
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The proliferation of private equity firms should be of great concern to the labour movement. As 
Chandrasekhar explains, private equity is acquired either through the private placement of new 
shares or the sale of pre-existing shares by the controlling interest, and therefore has features that 
characterize most takeovers (Chandrasekhar, 2007: 1). It is important to note that banks and 
pension funds account for a significant share of the total capital raised by private equity. For 
instance, of the total of Euro 161.3 billion raised between 1998 and 2002, banks, pension funds 
and insurance companies accounted for 58 percent of the commitment in Europe 
(Chandrasekhar, 2007: 4). Doubtless, similar trends could be observed elsewhere.  
 
The presence and activity of private equity firms have continued to increase. Quoting estimates 
by Thomson Financial, 2006 was a record year for private equity in both fundraising and 
investments. 684 PE funds raised a record US$ 432 billion worldwide in 2006, led by Buyout 
and Real Estate funds with US$ 213 billion and US$ 63 billion respectively.  The total value of 
announced private equity buyout deals hit a record US$ 700 billion in 2006, more than double 
the record set in 2005 and 20 times bigger than in 1996 (Metrics 2.0, 2007). Clearly, private 
equity expansion is very strong. According to Preqin, an investor services company, the number 
of  PE firms looking to invest increased to an all-time high of 4,270 in 2009, more than three 
times as many as there were a decade earlier. Broadening the PE universe to include firms that 
do not manage or invest out of distinct private equity funds, the total rises to approximately 
6,000 (Barn and Company, 2010). In terms of capital that was available for the industry to 
deploy at year-end 2009, Barn and Company (2010) estimates totaled more than US$ 1 trillion—
about three times the amount available at the end of the 200. This is the amount of capital that 
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was committed but not yet invested. That capital is available for investment across asset classes: 
US$ 508 billion waiting to be used in buyouts, US$ 159 billion earmarked for venture capital. 
Real estate assets acquisition would gobble US$ 188 billion. According to Barn and Company, 
that amount was ―prodigious‖ (p. 20). In other words it was ―unmatched‖.  
 
As Chandrasekhar (2007) suggested, it is this increased presence and activity of private equity 
firms that has been a source of contention, especially with the hostile takeovers of the 1980s 
through leveraged buy-outs (LBOs).  The classic example was the $25 billion buyout of RJR 
Nabisco in 1989. According to Croft and Hebb, what was interesting about this case was that the 
Oregon Teacher‘s Fund helped finance the record buyout. It was considered a disaster and 
misguided commercial transaction, which resulted in thousands of layoffs (Croft and Hebb, 
2002). Central to Croft and Hebb analysis was that worker‘s own savings were a principal source 
of this disruptive restructuring. 
 
These kinds of investment, and the changes in the financial market facilitated by the neoliberal 
regime, have had adverse effects on economic development and labour. According to Joseph 
Schumpeter and Alfred Chandler (cited in Crotty, 2004: 2), nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) 
have been the main source of most of the capital investment, technological change and 
productivity growth during this period and for most of the twentieth century‘s achievements in 
the United States. For instance, hundreds of thousands of people were employed by only a small 
number of giant corporations, in the United Stated (Lazonick and O‘Sullivan 2000). According 
Lazonick and O‘Sullivan huge revenues generated by these corporations were allocated 
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according to a corporate governance principle called ―retain and invest‖. This implied that 
corporation would retain both the revenues realized and the workers, and reinvest in ―physical 
capital and complementary human resources‖ (Lazonick and O‘Sullivan 2000: 14). As Lazonick 
and O‘Sullivan posit, this retentions provided financial foundation for corporate growth.  
 
However, as Crotty (2004) explains, neoliberalism came with a slowdown in the rate of global 
aggregate demand growth and increased competition in many product markets; and a shift from 
long-term growth to impatient short-term financial markets. Crotty goes a step further and asserts 
that the combined effects of these changes forced management in many firms to switch from the 
long-term goals and ―high-road‖ labour relations to short-term ―survivalist‖ strategies that 
involved attacks on labour and on key firm suppliers (Crotty, 2004: 2).  
 
For example, during the 1980s and 1990s the US corporations witnessed strategic shift away 
from ‗retain and reinvest‘ towards downsize and distribute‘ (Lazonick and O‘Sullivan 2000). As 
a result, the labour force in most major US corporations since the 1980s had eroded the quantity 
of jobs that offered stable employment and real pay. The loss of employment also meant 
weakening the trade unions, who were supposed to be defending the interests of the same 
employees. The effect was a further deterioration in the conditions of work and living standards.  
 
For those who had lost employment, the chances were that they would not find employment 
anytime soon. If they managed to find it, the income in most cases was less than what they were 
getting in their previous job. This brought about insecurity among employees in terms of fear of 
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losing a job. There was also a growing income inequality as top management received more than 
workers. This was because their rewards were now linked to the rise in stock prices. Thus, the 
higher the price, the more management‘s rewards went up. Lazonick and O‘Sullivan (2000) 
report that job security measured with the proxy of change in job tenure was on the decline and it 
varied based on gender and the age of workers. The change in job tenure also had had effect on 
the social security for employees as its precarious nature now affected the pension – accrued and 
legibility.  
 
Simpson reports that largest pension funds across the globe have rapidly increased their exposure 
to overseas equity (2001). For example, in 1998, the 200 largest US pension funds held close to 
US$ 300 billion of assets in their international portfolio. According to Simpson, the California 
Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), the nation‘s largest public pension fund in the 
US with total net assets of $181.1 billion, made a decision to shift overseas allocation from 12 
percent to 20 percent of their assets in order to diversify and capture the benefits of high 
potential growth rate in overseas markets. This shift was facilitated by liberalisation in regulatory 
rules, for example, in the UK, where pension funds on average now hold 25 percent of their 
equity assets abroad. The net result of these trends is that financial flows to developing and 
emerging markets in the past decade have grown dramatically (Simpson, 2001).  
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2.4 Pension Fund Governance 
 
The pension fund growth in assets and equity holdings has been phenomenal. However, as 
Simpson posits, there are a number of features relating to the structure of pension funds which 
give them an important role to play in the corporate governance of the companies whose equity 
they own. She asserts that pension funds invest assets to cover relatively long term liabilities. 
Therefore, the investment horizon is denominated in decades. Accordingly, pension funds should 
have an interest in the long term performance of their assets. In equity terms, this means the long 
term performance of companies (Simpson, 2001). 
 
According to Clark and Hebb (2003), following the collapse of the technology, media and 
telecoms (TMT) stock bubble in 2000 and the subsequent corporate governance scandals of 2001 
and 2002, higher standards of accountability, transparency, and social and environmental 
behaviour are all receiving more attention from pension fund investors in the post-Enron, post-
WorldCom business environment. According to the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) 
discussion paper, the Enron scandal, wiped out over 6,000 jobs and attendant health care and 
retirement savings overnight. As TUAC discussion paper reports, the scandal also took with it 
Arthur Andersen, one of the world‘s biggest auditing and business services firms. For Kenneth 
Lay, Enron‘s CEO, received a salary in 2000 of US$ 53 million, along with US$ 123 million of 
exercised stock options and a further US$ 361 million in unexercised stock options (TUAC, 
2005).  
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As if that was not enough, TUAC discussion paper report that, at a time when workers were 
suffering real cuts in wages, health care benefits and pension provisions, a CEO earned 40 times 
the average wage of the company‘s workers in 1980, or now earns around 530 times that in the 
US (TUAC, 2005). It is these issues that are an irony for trade unions. How do they defend and 
promote the interest of their members? 
 
TUAC discussion paper attributes the breakdown in corporate governance to ―a failure of public 
policy – the implementation by governments and regulatory authorities of flawed systems of 
corporate governance and accountability that fail to stop the looting of companies by their elites‖ 
(TUAC, 2005: 2)  
 
The collapse in corporate governance can be traced back to the shareholders regaining some 
control over management through the prism of ―maximising share value‖ in the 1970s and 1980s 
(TUAC, 2005). The rationale was that management was not acting in the interest of the 
shareholders. Therefore, there was need to rectify this assumed normally and ensure that 
managers were accountable to the shareholders. During the 1990s, the emergence of shareholder 
activism witnessed the growing importance of institutional investors, like pension funds.  
 
According to TUAC discussion paper, the rise of the shareholder value model was facilitated by 
institutional investors who then became pre-eminent capital market players. Among them were 
pension funds, which saw their assets rise with a portfolio mix that has shifted towards equities – 
increasingly foreign, and in ever riskier emerging markets as noted above (TUAC, 2005).  
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TUAC discussion paper explains that the institutional investors have for a long time delegated 
their investment policy to asset managers, whose interests lie in short-term profits, not in the 
long-term interests of their beneficiaries, which are determined by the structure and components 
of their fees. Accordingly, without proper regulation and market incentives, the needs of the 
ultimate owners of collective investment schemes, workers and households, have become 
secondary to the needs of the financial investment industry itself (TUAC, 2005).  
 
As TUAC discussion paper points out, institutional investors‘ interest lies not in the 
sustainability of the investments, but in short-term financial returns. Others argue that pension 
fund managers‘ tendency toward short-term investment stands in direct contradiction to the long 
investment period necessary to realize gains from high standards of corporate behaviour (Clark 
and Hebb, 2003). The only remedy to this problem is the workers‘ pension fund trustees.  
 
TUAC discussion paper highlights how trade unions in other countries are promoting their 
members‘ rights as shareholders to have a voice in corporate decision-making and, more broadly, 
to bring about good corporate governance regimes in those companies where their pension funds 
hold equity. The aim of such campaigns is to secure high levels of retirement income, while 
ensuring that the deferred income is invested in sustainable corporations (TUAC, 2005). Citing 
the USA, Canada and the UK, the AFL-CIO, the CLC, the TUAC respectively have committed 
substantial resources to mobilize ―workers‘ capital‖ behind corporate governance reforms, and 
are increasingly influencing the pension fund industry, especially through their trustee networks 
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(TUAC, 2005). This is a big lesson for other trade union internationally, who are fighting for the 
same cause. 
 
Practical steps in mobilizing workers‘ capital as proposed by TUAC discussion paper include 
educating union and other worker trustees of such funds to use their leverage to change the 
behaviour of pension fund managers. According to TUAC discussion paper, the union leadership 
can also engage the investment managers of these funds while seeking regulatory changes to 
empower the trustees and the relevant funds. A number of successes have been registered, 
notably concerning the remuneration policy of the board of directors, the separation of the CEO 
and Chair of the board, the promotion of non-executive directors who are ―independent‖ from 
management, and respect for workers‘ rights. The AFL-CIO and its affiliates are now the leading 
US organizations filing proxy resolutions at AGM meetings (TUAC, 2005). 
 
2.5 Trade Unions and Pension Fund Management 
 
Pension plans have always been a concern for the labour movement (Freeman, 1983). According 
to Freeman (1983), the earliest pension plans for blue—collar workers were originated by the 
labour movement. Cook  reports that ―the first truly union-sponsored pension plan appears to 
have been that founded by the Pattern Makers League of North America in 1890‖, even though 
―that plan never paid benefits‖ (2002: 29). According to Munnel (1982:9), the Granite Cutters' 
International Association of America established the first functional union old - age plan in 1905. 
However, Lateimer (1932) cited to Cook (2002) points to the International Typographical Union 
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as the first large union to create a regular pension plan in 1907. The motivation of these efforts 
by early trade unions was to improve the hardships of workers (Cook, 2002). 
 
In recent years, unions have expanded the scope on pension issues from worker benefits to how 
pension fund money is being used in the capital market (Freeman, 1983). In his examination of 
the role of trade unions in pension coverage; expenditures by firms for pensions; the provisions 
of pension plans and; pension fund investments, one of Freeman‘s basic findings was that unions 
greatly increase pension coverage, and alter the determinants of coverage, in ways that go 
beyond the tradition role of trade unions of bargaining better wages and improved working 
conditions (Freeman, 1983). 
 
Similarly, Calvert (2005) highlights four reasons why trade unions are seeking joint control of 
pension fund management as;  i) to be able to deal with administrative issues so as to ensure  that 
concerns of plan members and beneficiaries are handle fairly and promptly; ii) to determine the 
design of pension benefits, including the priority given to options such as early retirement, health 
benefits and medical coverage; iii) to deal with pension surpluses/deficits and, particularly, the 
issue of contribution holidays which public employers have been prone to take, unilaterally, 
during periods of high investment returns, and; iv) to have a say in investment policy (Calvert, 
2005: 1). 
 
A strong case can be made that labour unions are concerned about pension funds because the 
financial leverage provided by the control of fund assets would help labour unions retard, and, 
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perhaps, reverse a secular decline in membership which appears to be accelerating (Bennett and 
Johnson, 1981: 182). This pension power, therefore, has been part of the renewal of unions in 
Canada after the demise of the fordist collective agreements. This theme is discussed in many 
other western countries as well, and is generally referred to by the term ―Working Capital.‖ The 
objective is both to change existing investment practices on the part of financial managers and to 
develop financial innovations for the benefit of workers and the community (Bennett and 
Johnson, 1981). 
 
Paul Wessel cited in Fogdall (2001) has discussed how unions could use the leverage provided 
by pension funds in several ways, among them: in "coordinated capital investment boycott 
campaigns against antiunion industries, in the "exercise of shareholder voting rights, in the use of 
funds to "finance home mortgages or other loans" for union members, and in the "investment of 
assets in unionized businesses to create jobs.  
 
The experience of the trade union movement globally, most notably in the US and Canada, has 
demonstrated that by becoming involved in pension fund management a number of important 
gains can be made. These include achieving reforms of corporate governance, ensuring 
companies recognise their social responsibilities, and directing capital to areas of the economy 
that traditional institutional investment has failed to serve properly (Trades Union Congress, 
2003: 1). More importantly, getting involved in the management of pension fund will ensure that 
the interests of plan members and beneficiaries are protected (Carmichael and Quarter, 2003). 
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Weststar and Verma (2007), suggest three inter-related strategic decisions that unions and their 
representatives should make regarding their involvement pension fund governance. First, unions 
must work to obtain a seat on the board, and fill it with either a labour trustee or a professional 
hired for the purpose. Second, unions build capacity in labour trustee with financial background 
to enable them to actively participate in investment decisions to protect the pensions of fund 
beneficiaries. Third, unions must decide if they want their trustees to push for the application 
alternative investment policies such as Social Responsible Investment (SRI) (Weststar and 
Verma 2007). 
 
Simply defined, SRI refers to the integration of social, environmental and ethical issues (both 
positive and negative) into investment decision making (Richardson, 2007). Social responsible 
investment takes a number of different forms: asset screening, community investing, social 
venture capital, economically targeted investment and shareholder advocacy (Quarter and others 
2001; Munnell and Sundén, 2004 and Yaron, 2005).  
 
Asset screening is a process of applying social screens, either negative or positive, to 
investments. For instance, a negative screen would result if investments are prohibited in a 
particular company that has a poor record of labour standards; and a positive screen would 
involve actively investing in companies with a good environmental record (Gifford, 2004 and 
Quarter and others 2001). 
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Community investment refers to capital financing that is aimed at addressing the needs of 
communities that cannot ordinarily be addressed by traditional investment models. The rational 
is to better the economic and social development of a historically disadvantaged group or 
community (Canadian Socially Responsible Investment Review 2006).  
 
Economically targeted investment can be defined ―an investment designed to produce a 
competitive rate of return commensurate with risk as well as create collateral economic benefits 
for a targeted geographic area, group of people, or sector of the economy‖ (Bruyn, 1987: 67 cited 
in OPSEU Policy statement, 2002: 65). Economically targeted investments strategies have 
proven successful in real estate development and mortgage trusts. The principle behind such 
investment strategies is the dual outcome of reasonable rate of return for the plan and collateral 
benefits for the community in the form of jobs, sustainable businesses and affordable housing. 
Pension funds, therefore, can provide development capital for such needed investment (OPSEU 
Policy statement, 2002). 
 
Shareholder activism enables investors to engage enterprises in which they invest and play an 
active role in ensuring that their performance meets the best interest of the beneficiaries. The 
underlying principle for shareholder activism is to improve long-term corporate performance and 
to further the interests of beneficiaries. Therefore, to enhance shareholder value, shareholders 
can participate in the governance of the corporation by voting on shareholder and approve 
business proposed by corporate management. They also have a major influence on executive 
compensation and reporting on compliance with international labour and environmental 
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standards. In cases were investments functions have been delegated to investment managers, the 
pension trustees have a fiduciary duty to supervise that voting of all proxies are in the best 
interest of beneficiaries (Yaron and Kodar, 2002). 
 
The Ontario Public Service Employees' Union (OPSEU) pension model provides a perfect 
example of struggle of workers and their unions for an adequate pension.  The union took a 
proactive position on the investment practices of the public service pension fund. It challenged 
government's policy of investing exclusively in its own nonmarketable debentures as serving 
only the employer's interests and inappropriate since the returns were well below market rates 
and did not provide a sustainable fund in the long run. OPSEU also suggested other investment 
strategies such as making residential mortgages directly available to members of the plan, and 
indirectly through the financing of housing projects (OPSEU, 2002).  
 
According to OPSEU, it should be possible to address important social and economic concerns 
through the investment of the fund. However, investment strategies should reflect the interests of 
all of those with a stake in the security and economy of the plan. Therefore, there should be a 
well-established process for considering investments other than those indicated by conventional, 
technical factors. This process should include equal representation of the employer and the 
employees (OPSEU, 2002)   
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Collectively, the trade union movement could have a financial clout to rival that of the banks. To 
exercise this clout, trade unions and their trustees must develop new areas of expertise in capital 
market strategies, investment and economic development (OPSEU, 2002). 
 
Indeed, there is a great deal that South African trade unions can learn from these investment 
practices that can benefit the workers and society in general.  
 
Organized labour‘s active participation in pension matters continues up to this day. How the 
workers‘ money is invested and how it is managed is crucial to delivering an adequate pension 
benefit to union members. Trade union representation in the administration of pension fund is 
crucial to ensure that the funds are secure and well managed and the benefits are delivered. Trade 
unions argue that their representation on pension boards is crucial to ensuring that the funds are 
secure and well managed to the benefit of workers and their communities. The contention is that, 
in some cases, pension funds have been mismanaged and performance, as measured by 
reasonable standards, has been poor (Iglesias and Palacios 2000). Some of the investment 
practices of pension funds have been misdirected with little public accountability, limited access 
to information, and unclear management processes. 
 
The Global Union Discussion Paper (2005) noted that countries with funded pension systems, 
trade unions are promoting their members‘ rights as shareholders to have a voice in corporate 
sdecision-making and, more broadly, to bring about good corporate governance regimes in those 
companies where their pension funds hold equity. This is also applicable to pension issues.  
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2.6 South African labour movement and pension funds 
 
Pillay (2008) asserts that South African working class has been put on defensive by the growing 
power of capital, ―as capitalists penetrate into all components of the economy‖ (Stafford, 
1987:157), through the process of globalization.  According to Pillay, even socialism, which was 
workers‘ only hope has struggles to reassert itself on the national agenda. One wonders what 
options are available to the once formidable labour movement to deal with effects of 
informalization of labour, high unemployment, persistent poverty and growing social inequality 
(Pillay, 2008: 45). Silver (2003) and Von Holdt and Webster (2008) highlight the different 
sources of power for trade unions. The focus on the workers‘ source of power is significant to the 
trade union as it determine avenues of revitalising trade unions in the global era. The 
restructuring at the work places has resulted in casualisation and externalisation which has in 
turn shifted the workers‘ sources of power. The trade unions need to have an understanding of 
these alternative sources of power and design strategies of asserting themselves. Control of 
pension fund investment presents alternative sources of power for trade unions. Weststar and 
Verma writes that greater activism in pension funds may be a ―means to union renewal‖  at this 
time of the union decline and debate over their relevance in effectively representing workers 
interests (2008: 2). 
 
According to Southall (2007), demands among unionised black workers for control over private 
pension funds became a crucial issue in the 1980s. In 1981 the government was forced by 
industrial unrest to withdraw legislation which proposed that workers would only be able to 
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withdraw their pension contributions after they retired. Southall reports that unions in the metal 
industry won the right to sit on the board of the industry‘s pension fund in 1983 and in 1987 the 
Chemical Workers Industrial Union persuaded employers to co-manage the Chemical Industries 
provident fund with elected union representatives (Southall, 2007).  
 
The labour movement has noted that mutual insurance companies like SA Mutual and Sanlam 
control and manage enormous sums of provident fund contributions from workers, while they do 
not grant real ownership rights to the workers (Social Equity and Job Creation; 35). As Pillay 
(2003) posit, this gave the Mutual Funds an upper hand in setting business agenda. As such it 
was felt that rules should be changed to allow workers to participate in the management of their 
funds. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a policy framework for the 
African National Congress (ANC), there was need for the government to change the laws and 
ensure adequate representation for workers through their trade unions and make the funds more 
socially responsible (ANC, 1994: 112). Thus, in 1996, the Pension Fund Act was amended 
granting trade unions 50 percent representation on the board of trustees on pension funds.  
 
Following these victories, the idea grew that union trustees would exert active influence over the 
companies where retirement funds are invested. The motivation was to enhance company 
governance, influence investment policy and promote social responsibility. It was hoped that by 
controlling pension funds, unions would be able to influence investment patterns that would 
generate real productive activity and jobs; strengthen democratic governance in the way 
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enterprises are currently managed; and use the profit generated from enterprises in the social 
sector for the benefit of workers and communities (COSATU, 1997).  
 
However, a study conducted on behalf of COSATU by Fifth Quadrant Actuaries and Consultants 
in 2003 on performance of trustees on pension fund boards revealed numerous problems. It 
stated that trustees were often extremely busy people with inadequate time to devote to 
investment issues; some worker trustees tended to treat their appointment to pension boards as a 
perk involving time off work, business travel and expense claims; and yet others were 
intimidated by, or deferred to, management representatives, fund principal officers or asset 
managers (Southall, 2007). Consequently, the labour movement may fail to effectively utilise 
these sources of power to their advantage as a result of failure to correctly harness the workers‘ 
source of power (Silver, 2003 and Von Holdt and Webster 2008), that is, the pension fund. 
Therefore, there is need to exploit how pension fund management can be a source of power in 
the global era.  
 
This research will, therefore, endeavour to review the extent to which trade unions have been 
able to maintain pension fund benefits and influence investments in social sector for the benefit 
of workers and communities in South Africa. 
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Chapter Three – Methodology 
  
3.0 Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the role of trade unions in pension fund 
investment management in South Africa with the focus on assessing the extent to which they 
have been able to promote and protect the interest of their members and direct pension fund 
investment in areas that would have a positive impact on the working families and their 
communities. This chapter, therefore, discusses the methodological approach employed in the 
study. The study used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
 
3.1 Study Setting and Population 
 
The study was carried out in South Africa. Interviews with trade unions and their federation were 
conducted. Interviews with scheme administrators and service providers were done.  Other 
stakeholders involved in various capacities of pension management were also interviewed. These 
included Financial Services Board (FSB), as a regulator and other experts in the pension 
industry.  
 
3.3 Selecting Procedure 
 
The study used non-probability sampling techniques. All respondents were purposively selected. 
Precisely, this was ―expert sampling‖, as the researcher was looking for individuals with 
particular expertise that would be able to move the interest of the researcher forward (Given et 
45 
 
al, 2008). This was appropriate given the recognition among qualitative researchers that some 
informants are 'richer' than others and that these people are more likely to provide insight and 
understanding for the researcher (Marshall, 1996:524). This procedure, therefore, enabled the 
researcher to obtain systematic information that was able to meet the assumptions of the research 
design (Watters and Biernacki, 1989). In other words, purposeful sampling afforded the 
researcher an opportunity to use his judgment in selecting respondents that were considered most 
informative for the problem being investigated.  
 
Accordingly, three (3) trade unions affiliated to COSATU were selected for this study. These 
unions provided key information on the experiences and challenges faced in trying to influencing 
pension fund investment decisions in South Africa. These included the National Union of Mines 
(NUM), National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) and National Education, 
Health Workers Union (NEHAWU). The criterion was to have a union representation from both 
public and private sector so as to have different perspectives on their experiences with pension 
fund management. The interviews were conducted at the union offices.  
 
The study envisioned to interview the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), as a 
labour federation, on the labour movement‘s policy with regard to pension fund management. 
However, at the time of data collection, there was no one in-charge of pension matters at 
COSATU. The person who was responsible for coordinating national policy on retirement funds 
was suspended due to alleged corrupt practice regarding his dealings with some service 
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providers. Unfortunate as the situation may be, it was interesting to the researcher as it bordered 
on some of the issues that the study was trying to explore.  
 
Effort was made to look at other federation. Therefore, Federation of Democratic Unions of 
South Africa (FEDUSA) agreed to the interviewed.  It has to be mentioned, however, that 
information from COSATU website was very useful. 
 
Three pension funds, where the unions being considered in this study have seats on board of 
trustees, were interviewed to provide first hand information on the types of assets, investments 
and practice of pension fund management. These were Government Employees Pension Fund 
(GEPF), MIBFA and Mine Employees Pension Fund. Contact with these schemes was 
established through recommendation from trade unions. Additionally, one investment manager, 
the 27Four Investment Managers and Todaytrustee were interviewed. All the interviews were 
conducted at the respective offices of Pension Funds/Administrators.  
 
Due to access problem and time constraint, the views from FSB were sourced from their official 
documents, many of which are accessible on their website.  
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Table 2:  Selected Sample 
Research 
component 
Respondents Contribution 
 Investment Manager 
 27Four Investment 
Managers 
 
 
Interviews 
Representative from Federation 
 FEDUSA 
 
Information on labour 
movement‘s policy on pension 
fund management 
 Three (3) COSATU Affiliates  
 NEHAWU 
 NUM 
 NUMSA 
 
Experiences of trustees and 
challenges they in influencing 
pension fund investment 
decisions 
 Three (3) Pension 
Funds/Administrators  
 GEPF 
 MEPF 
 MIBFA 
 
Information on  pension fund 
management practice, size of 
pension; investment policies 
 
This relatively small sample size provided thick data with rich narratives (Wang and Lin 2009). 
In qualitative studies, the sample size is not limited. It is driven by the desire to learn in detail 
and in depth about the experience of individuals (Tuckett, 2004). As Marshall (1996) posit, an 
appropriate sample size for a qualitative study should be one that would adequately answer the 
research question. Marshall further states that the number of required subjects usually becomes 
obvious as the study progresses, as new categories, themes or explanations stop emerging from 
the data. This is a point of data saturation where ‗no new information of significance is obtained‘ 
for ongoing thematic development and theorising (Tuckett, 2004: 8).  
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3.4 Data Collection 
 
Qualitative methods of data collection were used. These enabled the collection of in-depth 
information on individuals‘ personal histories, perspectives, and experiences of members of trade 
unions on pension issues. Both primary and secondary data were collected. 
 
3.4.1 Interviews  
 
3.4.1.1 In-depth interviews 
 
The study benefited from individual face-to-face in-depth interviews using semi structured 
questions. According to Wang and Lin (2009: 279), ―in-depth interviewing is a flexible guided 
method that allows the researcher to lead an open conversation and does not limit participants in 
terms of sharing so that data collection is even more interactive‖. In other words, it broadens the 
scope for open-ended answers and encourages discussion (Woods, 2006). Therefore, in-depth 
interviews enabled the researcher to collect in-depth information on stakeholders‘ views and 
perspectives about the extent of trade unions influence on pension fund investment management.  
 
In order to facilitate detailed and ‗objective‘ analysis, all interviews were tape recorded and 
detailed notes were taken during interviews (Becker 1998). 
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3.4.2 Document review 
 
A thorough  review  of  important  documents  that  shed  light  on  pensions  and  trade  unions  
was conducted.  This  review  was  both  general  and  specific  to  the  situation  of  the  pension 
fund investment management in South Africa. The  sources  for  this  data  collection  method 
included:  related  books,  articles,  journals,  pieces  of  legislation,  policy  documents, 
published  and  unpublished  papers  and  documents  from  the  libraries  in  and  outside  South 
Africa  and  the  Internet. The main document reviewed included policy documents, pieces of 
legislation, annual financial reports and trade union conference resolutions. 
 
The researcher was aware that although review of documents might provide useful information 
with regard to reconstructing events, and giving information about social relationships, they do 
not all provide an objective truth (Woods, 2006). The context within which they were 
construction should be taken into account. As Woods (2006) suggests, the task of the researcher, 
therefore, was to find out how they were constructed, and tease out areas that are relevant to the 
study.   
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
 
Taking into account the amount of data envisaged, the computer was used to analyse some of the 
qualitative data. Atlas.ti, computer software for processing and analysing qualitative data was 
used.  Typed transcripts from audiotapes were assigned to Atlas.ti and coded. In addition to pre-
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determined, instrument-based codes, all transcripts and the researcher‘s notes were read 
thoroughly in order to tease out emerging themes and allow for generation of new codes for data 
sorting. After generating code-based outputs from Atlas.ti, a further systematic analysis was 
done, making use of content analytic summary table. These helped present data on codes from 
different respondents on the same matrix to allow for effective comparison and holistic analysis 
of the data. Thematic conceptual matrices were also used to analyze data under different themes.   
 
3.5.1 Assessment Criteria 
 
The extent to which trade unions have been able to promote the interest of members was 
assessed in terms of how trade unions have been able to use the social responsible investment 
approach and the extent to which this framework contributed to social investment and corporate 
accountability. These include ethical screening and economically targeted investment. 
 
Trade unions‘ influence in using enterprises‘ profits in sectors for the benefit of workers and 
communities were assessed by reviewing the extent to which pension fund are able to invest in 
areas that would bring about collateral benefits to the community. 
 
The trade unions‘ contribution to strengthening corporate governance was assessed by focusing 
on the governance structure of the pension fund, shareholder activism and the selection of 
trustees.  
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3.6 Ethical Consideration 
 
The study adhered to research ethical required. The research protocol was cleared by the 
Witwatersrand University Research Ethics Committee (Non – Medical).  
 
Respondents were informed that their participation in the study was entirely voluntary and they 
could choose not to participate if they did not want to. Further, during the interview they may 
choose not to answer the questions that they do not want to answer and could withdraw from the 
interview at any time. In this regard, only consenting participants were interviewed.  
 
To minimize the risk of the study to the respondents and ensure that they were protected, the 
researcher considered confidentiality and anonymity as major concerns. Therefore, the 
participants were guaranteed of full protection on the information they provided. No personal 
identifier has been left on the interview tapes or transcripts. Personal names and other identifying 
information in the text have been replaced by dummy words (Wang and Lin, 2009). Consent 
forms and data tapes have been kept in locked files and are only accessed by the researcher. 
Additionally, computer records have been password-protected to prohibit illicit access. 
 
3.7 Limitations and strengths of the study 
 
The study acknowledges the practical problems. Trade unions and pension fund investment 
management is a broad subject area that require time and resources beyond what is currently 
available. As such, this had a bearing on the adequate of data to be collected. Consequently, the 
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analysis was restricted to what was available and not  necessarily  all  that  may  be  needed  to  
undertake  a  comprehensive research  study.  
 
The research instruments employed are also limited in the extent to which can adequately 
respond to the research question. This has an effect on the credibility and quality of the findings 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). As Lincoln and Guba (1985) cited in Wang and Lin (2009) 
postulate, scientific research should be able to provide results in terms of qualitative research that 
can be consulted and contrasted in the form that is credible, transferable, dependable and 
confirmable. To deal with this concern, the researcher used several methods to increase the 
chances of depth and accuracy. Additionally the researcher benefited from interviewing different 
respondents on the issue. These are some common forms of triangulation (Woods, 2006).  
 
The study aims to contribute to the debate on the role of trade unions in pension fund investment 
management. There are 196 registered trade unions in South Africa as at 31 August, 2010
iii
. 
However, only three trade unions were considered in this case study. Therefore, the scope is 
limited. In this case, the researcher will take care not to make inappropriate generalizing claims 
on the findings (Woods, 2006). However, according to Woods (2006), the findings will 
―contribute to an archive of studies‖ on a trade unions and pension fund ―which then become 
reinterpreted‖ and form a basis for future research. 
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3.8 Reasons for using the method 
 
The Study aimed at understanding a particular phenomenon and its manifestations. It is set out to 
appreciate a particular process. In this case, accessing the extent to which trade unions have been 
able to promote the interest of their members and also influence pension fund investment 
decisions. For this reason, it is necessary to collect information from stakeholders in the process 
to determine their experience on the issue. Therefore, qualitative method is appropriate for its 
"attention to detail, the ability to embrace both verbal and non-verbal behaviour, to penetrate 
fronts, discover meanings, and reveal the subtlety and complexity of cases or issues‖ (Woods, 
2006).  
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Chapter Four – South Africa Pension Fund Industry  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the current pension fund industry in South Africa. The 
rationale is to identify how the existing framework affects the way trade unions participate in 
pension fund investment management and promote members‘ interests. The chapter is organised 
as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview of the South African pension industry in relation 
to the retirement arrangement to render context to the discussion that follows. Section 3 looks at 
pension fund investment regulation and management. Section 4 examines the types of pension 
funds and reviews some of the statistical information; how these have changed over the years 
and explore the implication for trade unions.  In section 5, selected pension funds are examined 
in terms if asset allocation, investment practices and composition trustees. Section 6 concludes 
the chapter. 
 
4.2 South African Pension Industry 
 
The two main components of South African pension system are: occupational (retirement) 
insurance; and social assistance. The retirement insurance is made up of a number of pension and 
provident funds and voluntary savings, which provide retirement benefits for the majority of the 
workforce employed in the formal sector. Social assistance is a non-contributory, means tested 
public benefit program to ensure that the poorest are targeted (Registrar of Pension Fund, 2003). 
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It covers social old age pensions, disability grants and child and family grants (Van der Berg, 
1999: 12; Allianz Global Investors AG, 2008). 
 
This paper focuses on the occupational pension. The first South Africa‘s pension fund was 
introduced in the old Transvaal (South African) Republic in 1882. According to Van der Berg, 
the system was not backed by legislation or convention, therefore, it could not have been 
considered as social insurance. Institutionalization of occupational insurance for retirement only 
took place after the 1920s. However, the enactment of the Pensions Funds Act of 1956 was the 
high point in regulating the financial responsibilities of pension funds (Van der Berg, 1992, 
1999).  
 
4.2.1 Pension Fund Governance Regulation 
 
Retirement funds in South Africa consist of pension and provident funds, retirement annuity, 
umbrella and preservation funds. In terms of the nature and extent of the supervision of such 
funds, the Pensions Funds Act 24 of 1956 of South Africa, gives responsibility to the Financial 
Services Board (FSB) over the following: 
 
 Self-administered funds ‗that invest their assets with bodies and institutions in the public and 
private sectors of the economy on their own behalf‘ (Registrar of Pension Fund, 2003). 
 Underwritten funds, which operate exclusively by means of policies of insurance issued by 
registered insurers in the Republic (Registrar of Pension Fund, 2003). 
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 Foreign funds, whose head offices, or head offices of the participating employers, are located 
outside the Republic but administer benefits to their members resident in the Republic and 
who are South African residents (Registrar of Pension Fund, 2003). 
 
Funds that falls outside the jurisdiction of the Registrar of Pension Fund: 
 
 Official funds, these are ―funds that have been established by special laws for employees of 
the State and certain parastatal institutions‖ (Registrar of Pension Fund, 2003).  The National 
Treasury supervises these funds.  
 Transnet Fund, fund for the employees of Transnet (Registrar of Pension Fund, 2003). 
 Telkom Fund, a fund for the employees of Telkom SA Limited and the Telkom Retirement 
Fund 
 The Post Office Pension Fund 
 Bargaining Council Funds (BCF), funds that result from a process of collective bargaining. 
The Department of Labour is responsible for the supervision of these funds (Registrar of 
Pension Fund, 2003). 
 
One important point to note from the above scenario is the diversity in the legislative landscape, 
comprising different acts and regulators (Allianz Global Investors AG, 2008). As Van der 
Merwe (2004: 311) suggested, if standards are applied consistently, one institution should be 
responsible for the regulation of all pension funds.  
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4.2.2 The structure of pension funds 
 
Retirement funds in South Africa can fall into two broad categories: defined contribution 
schemes and defined benefit schemes. This categorization is essential in understanding the 
functioning of the funds, in terms of determining the funding and the levels of benefit (Van der 
Berg, 2002; Van der Merwe, 2004).  
 
In a defined contribution scheme, the value of the benefit is determined by the value of all the 
contributions made on behalf of the beneficiary by the employee and the employer, in addition to 
the accumulated returns from investments made on such funds. The member, therefore, bears the 
risk of poor investment performance. On the other hand, the value of final benefit or pension in a 
defined benefit scheme is determined by the number of years of membership of the fund, times a 
certain percentage of final salary in the last month or year of work (Van der Berg, 2002).  
 
According to Van der Berg (2002), the contributions are to a certain extent obvious in the case of 
a defined contributions pension. Accordingly, the contributions together with the returns on 
investment, will determine the final benefit. Van der Merwe reports that defined contributions 
cannot experience a shortfall because the contributions are certain. This could explain why this 
setup is most popular among employers (Van der Merwe, 2004). As for a defined benefit 
pensions fund, the employer takes full responsibility for the funding of the scheme, that is, to 
―ensure that the value of the assets in the fund are adequate to cover the demands on the funds‖ 
(Van der Berg, 2002: 18). According to Van der Merwe, a shortfall in this case, may be corrected 
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by either ―increasing the rate of contributions‖ or by ―requiring a transfer from employers‖ (Van 
der Merwe, 2004).  In this circumstance, employers bear the investment risk. Arguably, this cost 
dimension makes the scheme unfavourable among employers.   
 
Van der Merwe goes a step further and distinguishes between a pension fund and a provident 
fund. In the case of a pension fund, only one third of accumulated amounts may be withdrawn as 
a lump sum when a person retires (the remaining two-thirds must be taken as a pension), while in 
a provident fund 100 percent of the accumulated amount may be paid at retirement (Van der 
Merwe, 2004: 314). 
 
4.3 Size, membership and assets of pension funds 
 
Over the past decades, South Africa has witnessed a rise in the number of pension funds. Using 
the latest statistics from the Financial Services Board, the registered retirement fund were 
estimated at 10 699 as of 31 March, 2010 (Financial Services Board, 2010). However, as Table 
4.1 shows, this figure was less than 11 271 registered private pension funds in 2008. Despite this 
reduction, the number remains significant.  
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Table 3:  South Africa Retirement Industry Statistics 2008 
   Fund     Member     Contribution     Assets  
       R million   R billion 
 
R billion 
Privately administered 
  
    5,741,605  
 
            52,551  
 
    898,933  
Underwritten  
  
    3,180,451  
 
            18,903  
 
    229,444  
Official 3 
 
    1,375,043  
 
            25,919  
 
    725,046  
Transnet/Telkom/PO 5 
 
       167,942  
 
              1,618  
 
      71,561  
Total     11,271      10,496,541                98,991     1,924,984  
Source: Financial Services Board South Africa, Annual Report 2006 & 2010 
 
In 2008, the total membership of retirement funds was 10 496 541. Of this figure, 8 557 228 
were active members and 1 939 313 pensioners, deferred pensioners and dependants (Financial 
Services Board, 2010). Caution is required here, as there is a possibility of double counting, for 
the reason that certain individuals are members of more than one fund. It is estimated that total 
pension fund contributions amounted to more than R99 billion in 2008. This was an increase of 
8.6 percent from R 91.1 billion in 2007 (Financial Services Board, 2010). Table 4.1 also 
highlights pension funds assets of R1 924 billion in 2008. According to the Financial Services 
Board, this was a decrease in the retirement fund industry assets of 0.7 percent, from R1 938 
billion in 2007. In the case of privately administered funds, the net assets decreased by 5.4 
percent, from R950 billion in 2007 to R898 billion in 2008. 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
4.4 Investment Regulation 
 
In order to provide an adequate pension to the members that would prevent them from falling 
into poverty in their old age, investment of their accumulated assets should be at the center of the 
retirement fund system. Rusconi (2007) states that the investment strategies chosen by 
participants can have a significant impact on the value of retirement benefits, but also on the 
risks to which these accumulating personal assets are exposed. Rusconi (2007) suggests that 
investment alternatives should not be proliferated as doing so would increase system costs 
without necessarily providing associated benefit.  
 
Regulation 28 of the Pension Fund Act of 1956 of South Africa sets limits relating to assets in 
which a registered fund may invest. According to the Regulation, a registered fund may invest 
only in an asset to the extent that a fair value of the investment of the fund does not exceed a 
certain threshold. The stipulated investment limits are summarized below (Regulation 28): 
 
 100 percent of the assets may be held in deposits and balances in current and savings 
accounts with a bank or a mutual bank, including negotiable deposits, and money market 
instruments ; however, only 20 percent may be put in one bank   
 75 percent of the assets may be invested in ordinary shares in companies excluding shares in 
property companies.  
 75 percent of the assets may be invested in shares and convertible debentures listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange other than the Development Capital Sector 
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 25 percent of the assets may be invested in immovable property and claims secured by 
mortgage bonds thereon.  
 20 percent Development Boards may be established under the Black Communities  
Development Act, 1984 
 20 percent may be invested in Rand Water Board 
 20 percent may be invested in Eskom 
 20 percent may be invested in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa  
 100 percent of the assets may be invested in bills, bonds and securities issued by the 
government of or by a  local authority outside the Republic‘ however, only 20 percent per 
may be put in each authority 
 100 percent of the assets may be invested in bills, bonds and securities issued or guaranteed 
by and loans to or guaranteed by a local authority authorised by law to levy rates upon 
immovable property; however, a maximum of 20 percent may be invested in one local 
authority. 
 
4.5 Pension Fund Management 
 
Characteristically, trustees of pension fund consisted of senior management of the sponsoring 
employer (Kerrigan, n.d.: 1996). However, South African trade unions have for a long time 
struggled for control of pension fund and the right to direct and decide on funds investments 
through the employee representation on boards of trustees. This is based on the argument that 
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pensions are workers‘ deferred wages. The study indicates that transformation has taken place in 
the governance of pension fund, initiated by trade unions. As one respondent noted: 
 
 “It was the insistence of COSATU to engage with the FSB and then there were 
amendments to the Pension Act …… to say Pension fund boards need to have a 
representation of the members of the fund. That is why we ended up with almost 
equal representation on pension board, where you have half members, though they 
might not necessarily be unionized‖ (PAT02iv). 
 
Furthermore, the Pension Fund Act of 1956 provides for a Board of Trustees for each pension 
fund, which is made up of the different stakeholders to protect the interests of members. 
Research results reveals that almost all the pension funds in South Africa have implemented the 
legal requirement of a representative Board of Trustees, with at least 50 percent of the trustees 
elected by plan participants. In this case, it can be stated that the appointment of employee 
representatives to pension trustee boards is an important aspect of the labour movement‘s 
involvement in pension funds (Carmichael and Quarter 2003 cited in Weststar and Verma 2007). 
This legal framework, therefore, gives trade unions leverage to control or influence investments 
decisions of their deferred wages. 
 
―And transformation has taken place where the union and the employers are still 
50/50. The pension fund…now clearly the union has got a bigger role to play 
because they appoint the trustees‖ (PAT04) 
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In addition, the FSB issued Circular PF 130 on 11 June 2007, which contains the main principles 
on good governance of retirement funds with regards to code of conduct, prudent investing and 
performance appraisals in respect of boards of trustees (Financial Services Board, 2010). This 
regulation has detailed how the boards of management and asset managers should conduct 
business in the interest of the members. According to the FSB, the board of trustees holds the 
fund assets in trust for the beneficiaries. They have a fiduciary relationship to the funds and 
must, therefore, ―act with integrity‖. Fiduciary duties require the board to ―deal with the assets or 
affairs of the fund in terms of the pension law, the common law, customary law, regulations‖ and 
―codes of conduct‖ applicable to the fund (Financial Services Board, 2007: 1). 
 
The fundamental principle, according to PF 130, is for the board of trustees to ―act with the 
utmost good faith towards the fund and in the best interest of all the members‖ at all times 
(Financial Services Board, 2007: 2). The circular requires trustees irrespective of whether they 
are employer-appointed, members-elected, in the employment of the sponsor or independent 
board members, to ―owe a primary duty of care to the fund and the members and beneficiaries‖, 
and ―not specifically accountable to or required to disclose any information to that group of 
persons or entities through whom they were appointed or elected as a board members‖. 
According to the PF 130, ―the board should be sensitive to managing the diversity of board 
effectively to ensure that any tension, fears, disagreements, influence, affiliations, special 
interest, etc. do not hinder decision-making‖(Financial Services Board, 2007). 
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Union, you know they tried to pull a person out of the board to say they did not 
follow the mandate of the union. But that‘s the union to say that once you are in 
the board you have to act in the best interest of the members, not of the members 
but of the fund (PAT02). 
 
 4.6 Review of Pension Governance in Selected Funds 
 
In this section the aim was to look at some selected pension funds and assess the models of the 
administrative structures that underline their operations and the constitution of their governing 
bodies. Further, it sought to examine their asset allocations and investment practices. 
 
4.6.1 Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF) 
 
The Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is one of the largest pension funds in Africa. 
The fund covers over 1.2 million active members, 318 000 pensioners and beneficiaries. 
Established in May 1996, GEPF is a defined benefit pension fund with assets worth R700 billion.  
It manages and administers pensions and other benefits for government employees in South 
Africa. 
 
4.6.1.1 Governance  
 
The GEPF is a jointly-controlled fund with 50/50 union-employer board of trustees. The first 
board was inaugurated in May 2005. This is a significant progress for the trade unions in gaining 
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some degree of control over the fund, in view of the fact that, the Minister of Finance had been 
the sole trustee, initially.   
 
The board consists of sixteen members. Eight of these members represent the government as the 
employer and eight represent GEPF members and pensioners.  Of the eight trustees representing 
members and pensioners, six are chosen by the labour representatives on the Public Service Co-
ordinating Bargaining Council. The other two are a pensioner member and a uniformed services 
member, both of whom are elected. The pensioner trustee is voted onto the Board by GEPF 
pensioners in a postal ballot.  
 
The term of office of the Board is four years. This model has a rotating Chairperson and Vice 
Chairperson of the board. At the time of this research, the Chairperson was an employer 
representative while the Vice Chairperson was an employee representative. 
   
The board members participate in the following five committees to help with the business of 
managing the GEPF:  
i) Finance and Audit Committee, which advises the Board on financial and audit matters 
such as the  
ii) Appointment of auditors, financial reporting and annual financial statements. 
iii) Benefits and Administration Committee, which advices on benefits and pension 
administration strategies and procedures.  
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iv) The Governance and Legal Committee reviews and advises on governance, legal and 
compliance issues, as well risk management, legal dispute resolution and amendments to 
the Government Employees Pension Law.  
v) The Human Resources Committee advises on the GEPF‘s human resources strategy, 
policy, procedures and structure. This includes the organisational structure and 
management. 
vi) Investment Committee ensures that the Fund meets its commitments to the United      
Nations Principles of Responsible Investment, monitors the investment mandate and 
advises on investment strategy and policy. 
 
The GEPF is an ideal model for trade unions. One aspect of trade unions (NEHAWU) 
participation in the administration of the fund is through the above committees. Therefore, 
employee representatives on the board need to have the capacity in order to exercise some degree 
of control over the management of the fund.  
 
4.6.1.2 Management of GEPF Investments 
 
The Public Investment Corporation (PIC) manages the assets of the GEPF.  The PIC is wholly 
owned by the South African government and is the only asset manager that serves South Africa‘s 
public sector. The PIC is registered with the Financial Services Board (FSB) as a financial 
services provider and is required to follow FSB-approved client investment mandates when 
investing funds. 
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When making investments for the GEPF, the PIC invests in four main asset classes, namely:   
 Equities; 
 Fixed Income; 
 Properties; and 
 Isibaya Fund. 
 
About 75 percent of the equities owned by the GEPF are managed by the PIC, with the other 25 
percent being managed by external fund managers. This is in line with the investment mandate 
that the GEPF has provided to the PIC.  
 
Table 4: Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) Assets Classes 2009 
 
Asset Classes Percentage 
Local equity 56 
Unlisted property 2.1 
Listed property 1.4 
Bonds 36.3 
Money market instruments 3.8 
Isibaya Fund 0.4 
Total 100 
   Source: GEPF Annual Report 2009 
 
In the money markets, GEPF only invest in instruments offered by domestic banks. In the case of 
bonds, GEPF invest in bonds traded through the Bond Exchange of South Africa or issued by 
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government, parastatals and companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
Limited.   
The GEPF has investments in retail, corporate, industrial and specialised properties across South 
Africa. GEPF also has strategic investments such as the 20 percent share in the Airports 
Company of South Africa (ACSA).  
  
The Isibaya Fund invests in black economic empowerment and infrastructure development 
projects that help to create jobs alleviate poverty and transform the economy.  
 
4.6.1.3 Socially Responsible Investment  
 
The GEPF is among the leaders in socially responsible investment in South Africa and has been 
a signatory to the United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment since 2006. As such, 
GEPF take environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into account when making 
investment decisions. Being a responsible investor means GEPF ensure that all investments not 
only deliver solid returns but also take environmental, social and governance issues into account. 
The fund also encourage the companies it invests in to strike a balance between profits and being 
socially responsible, and to actively manage their environmental impact while maintaining high 
levels of corporate governance standards.  
  
GEPF is committed to helping to build a better society and to play a part in making this happen. 
Some of the highlights of their efforts include:  
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 Developing and implementing a Responsible Investment Policy (RIP) to guide all 
the GEPF‘s investment decisions. 
 Leading the launch in early 2009 of the Principles of Responsible Investment 
Network in South Africa. This was in the spirit of promoting the Principles within 
the local pension fund industry and within the wider investment community.   
 Assisting the JSE to review of its Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) index for 
2008. The SRI index is used to assess how socially responsible South Africa‘s top 
listed companies are by looking at how well they care for the environment, how 
socially relevant they are and how seriously they take good corporate governance. 
 Through the PIC, engaging listed companies whose corporate governance and 
transformation, for example, have been unsatisfactory 
 
4.6.2 Metal Industries Benefit Funds Administrators (MIBFA) 
 
The Metal Industries Benefit Funds Administrators (MIBFA) administers the Engineering 
Industries Pension Fund and the Metal Industries Provident Fund. 
 
4.6.2.1  Engineering Industries Pension Fund 
 
The Engineering Industries Pension Fund is one of the largest Pension Funds in South Africa 
with total assets exceeding R37, 7 billion at market value. The Fund provides pension and lump 
sum benefits on retirement, retrenchment/redundancy and withdrawals to members or to their 
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beneficiaries on their death. Members automatically belong to the Metal and Engineering 
Industries Permanent Disability Scheme which provides a salary continuation benefit for 
members who have been declared permanently disabled by the Medical Advisors of the Scheme. 
 
The fund covers over more than 31 704 contributing members and 37 954 pensioners in receipt 
of monthly payments. Contribution and Investment income for 2009 amounted to (R 7 858 
million).  
 
4.6.2.1.1 Engineering Industries Pension Fund Asset Management 
 
As at 31 March 2009 the total market value of the assets of the Fund amounted to R37 739 
million. These assets were held in the following types of investments.  
 
Table 5: Engineering Industries Pension Fund Assets Classes 2009 
Asset Classes Percentage 
Equities 30.91 
Property 0.1 
International managers 9.07 
External managers 39.26 
Bonds and cash 20.66 
Total 100 
   Source: EIPF Annual Report 2009 
 
The Investments department of MIBFA managed 51.57 percent of the investment portfolio, the 
balance being managed by external managers. 
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4.6.2.2 Metal Industries Provident Fund 
 
The Metal Industries Provident Fund was established in May 1991 and provides lump sum 
benefits to members on retirement, retrenchment, resignation or dismissal or to their 
beneficiaries on their death. Members also automatically belong to the Metal and Engineering 
Industries Permanent Disability Scheme, which provides a salary continuation benefit for 
members who have been declared permanently disabled by the Medical Advisors of the Scheme. 
 
4.6.2.2.1 Metal Industries Provident Fund Asset Management  
 
As at the 31 March 2009 the assets of the Fund amounted to R18 775m. The assets were held in 
the following types of investments, per market values. 
Table 6: Metal Industries Provident Fund Assets Classes 2009 
    Asset Classes Percentage 
Shares in companies 32.24 
Offshore investment 7.66 
Bonds and cash 21.38 
External managers  38.72 
Total 100 
   Source: MIPF Annual Report 2009 
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4.6.2.2.2 Governance 
 
The management of the Fund is vested in a Board of Trustees, comprising an equal number of 
employee and employer representatives, with the Chairperson being appointed from either side 
on a two year rotational basis. 
 
The Employers are represented by the Steel & Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa 
(SEIFSA), whilst the Employees are represented by the following Trade Unions:- 
 National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) 
 Solidarity 
 Metal & Electrical Workers‘ Union of South Africa (MEWUSA) 
 United Association of South Africa (UASA) 
 South African Equity Workers‘ Association (SAEWA) 
 
4.6.3 Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund 
 
The Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund is a defined contribution pension fund registered 
in terms of the Pension Funds Act, No 24 of 1956. Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund 
aims to provide retirement solutions appropriate for all members in the mining and mining 
related industries.  
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The Fund offers flexible investment choice and pension income choice to members. Assets are 
actively managed through a multi-manager approach, and at 30 June 2009 the value of these 
assets under management amounted to R31 193 million. 
Currently the Fund serves the interests of 33 460 members and 22 398 pensioners. One hundred 
and two employers participate in the Fund. 
 
The Fund provides membership to employers and employees in the mining and mining-related 
industries in South Africa. 
 
4.6.3.1 Governance 
 
The Board of the Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund comprises 18 trustees, including an 
independent non-executive trustee (who is also the Chairperson) and 18 alternate trustees, one of 
whom is an independent non-executive trustee. Seven employer representatives are appointed by 
the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, six employee representatives are appointed by the United 
Association of South Africa (UASA), two employee representatives are appointed by the Mines 
Professional Association and two employee representatives are appointed by the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM). 
 
4.6.3.2 Investment Management 
 
The Board appoints the Investment Committee to monitor and report on investment managers of 
the Fund. The main responsibilities include review and recommend an overall investment policy 
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for approval by the Board of Trustees; review in the investment policy regularly. Ensure that the 
Fund's investment policy is implemented; select and appoint consultants, investment managers 
and custodians; approve an investment mandate for each investment manager, including an 
appropriate benchmark for performance measurement purposes; and monitor investment 
activities. 
 
4.6.4 Mine Employees Pension Fund (MEPF)  
 
The Mine Employees Pension Fund is a pure defined contribution pension fund registered in 
terms of the Pension Funds Act, No 24 of 1956. 
The Fund offers flexible investment choice and pension income choice to members. Assets are 
actively managed through a multi-manager approach and at 30 June 2009 the fair value of these 
assets under management amounted to R15 629 million. 
Currently the Fund serves the interests of 17 462 members and 22 478 pensioners. Fifty-one 
employers participate in the Fund. The Fund provides membership to employers and employees 
in the mining and mining-related industries in South Africa  
 
4.6.4.1 Governance 
 
The Board of the Mine Employees Pension Fund comprises 17 trustees, including an 
independent non-executive trustee (who is also the Chairperson) and 16 alternate trustees, one of 
whom is an independent non-executive alternate trustee. Seven employer representatives are 
appointed by the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, three employee representatives are 
75 
 
appointed by the United Association of South Africa (UASA), three employee representatives 
are appointed by Solidarity, two employee representatives are appointed by the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM) and one employee representative is appointed by the South African 
Equity Workers Association (SAEWA) 
 
4.6.4.2 Investment Management 
  
Appointed by the Board to monitor and report on investment managers of the Fund. The main 
responsibilities include: Review and recommend an overall investment policy for approval by the 
Board of Trustees; review in the investment policy regularly. Ensure that the Fund's investment 
policy is implemented; select and appoint consultants, investment managers and custodians; 
approve an investment mandate for each investment manager, including an appropriate 
benchmark for performance measurement purposes; and monitor investment activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Chapter Five – Trade Unions and Pension Fund Investments in South Africa 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The study focused on four areas, namely (i) the extent of trade unions in promoting the interest 
of pension fund members (ii) the extent of trade unions in influencing pension fund investments 
in sectors that would benefit the workers and their communities (iii) trade unions‘ contribution to 
strengthening pension fund governance and (iv) enhancing trade unions‘ influence and control of 
pension fund investments.  
 
5.2 Extent of trade unions in promoting the interest of pension fund members  
 
Trade unions‘ promotion of the interest of pension fund members was assessed by evaluating the 
extent to which union trustees are able to direct pension investments in such a way that they do 
not damage the fundamental economic and social interests of the fund beneficiaries. In this case, 
the impact is limited to pension fund members and beneficiaries, not necessarily the community 
in general. The economic and social interests of workers include: increased jobs and living 
wages, guaranteed employee benefits (health insurance, retirement plans and educational 
assistance), wealth building (profit sharing and home-ownership assistance) and skills 
development programs for employees (Hagerman, 2007).  
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Overall, respondents held the view that trade unions have had a critical role to play in promoting 
the interest of pension fund members. They bring diversity to the board of trustees and the 
necessary checks and balance to the administration of the fund. It should be noted that, prior to 
the 1980s, black workers did not have benefits such as pension fund and provident fund. 
According to a trade union respondent, the desire to establish a pension fund dates back to the 
1940s, when the then mine workers union called Africa Mine Workers, under the leadership J.B.  
Marx led a march that was organized to hand a memorandum to the Chambers of Mines. The 
memo contained some of the demands on decent accommodation and decent jobs. In the context 
of the quality of jobs, one of the demands was the provident fund. However, that strike did not 
achieve the intended objectives. In 1982, the launched National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) 
rekindled the flame. The Union started negotiating with the Chambers of Mines on the same 
issues. The demands that were put to the Chambers were also improved working conditions, 
decent accommodation and the provident fund. It was claimed that failure to agree with the 
Chambers on provident fund was one of the reasons that led to a strike in 1987, demanding the 
establishment of a provident fund or pension fund for workers. The Union managed to secure the 
demand of putting together the provident fund, which is called Mine Workers Provident Fund 
today. This was a significant achievement, even though many mine workers lost their lives in the 
process (PAT04). 
 
The structure of the retirement fund presents considerable challenge to trade unions in South 
Africa. As highlighted elsewhere in this report, South Africa has witnessed a shift from defined 
benefit to defined contribution. With regards to defined benefit fund, the risk is located within 
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the employer. During the period of economic turmoil that would result in loss of investments, the 
employer would write-down its asset values. Consequently, workers are guaranteed investment 
and accumulated benefits. The shortfall between what has been guaranteed must be paid by the 
employer. For defined contribution, workers are exposed to different risks. They have no 
protection. Their monies are invested into the equity market. The portion that goes to the most 
risk investment is bigger. For example, current allocation to equity market by the mine workers 
provident fund is 60 percent of the investment and very little to the bonds. Large sums of money, 
therefore, go to the most risky investments, such as equity market. 
 
However, some fund managers expressed the view that defined contribution fund was good as it 
gave employees the responsibility to make their own choices on how their funds should be 
invested (PAT01). 
 
The huge challenge for union trustees, however, is how to communicate and educate members 
about investment choices, risk profiling and decision - making. It was noted that members do not 
have the necessary level of education and expertise as some of the products could be 
complicated. As one responded noted: 
 
―You are asking the guys in the mining or manufacturing sector out of depth to 
make a decision on ZAR 4.5 billion worthy of pension assets; asking them to 
choose what is good for their retirement! So handing over the decision-making to 
the members is ….. a difficult job and often you find that members opt to go for 
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default options as opposed to exercise their right to make a choice because of the 
lack of knowledge and understanding‖ (PAT01). 
 
5.3 Extent of trade unions’ influence on pension fund investment decisions  
 
Assessing trade unions‘ influence on the investment of workers‘ pension fund will focus on the 
extent to which trustees are able to influence enterprises where pension funds have invested to 
use their profits in promoting social responsible investment (SRI) through asset screening, 
community investing, economically targeted investment and shareholder advocacy.  
 
The study observed that there is a general appreciation of social responsible investment among 
trade unions, pension fund managers and other industrial players.  Accordingly, institutional 
investors in South Africa together under a Committee on Responsible Investing by Institutional 
Investors (CRISA) to implement the United Nations Principles of Responsible Investing 
introduced in 2006, of which the GEPF is a founding signatory.  The committee has drafted the 
Code for Responsible Investing by Institutional Investors. These Principles are to persuade 
investors to integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into their investment 
decision making (CRISA Media Release 2 September 2010)
v
. 
 
These Codes consists of four principles as cited in the CRISA Media Release of  2 September 
2010):  
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i) Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Policy: requires institutional investors to 
develop a policy detailing the process of assessing the investment target‘s environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) fundamentals.  
 
ii) Responsible ownership: requires institutional investors to demonstrate a responsible 
approach to shareholding by implementing a policy detailing mechanisms of intervention 
and engagement with companies when concerns have been identified, as well as the 
means of escalation if concerns raised cannot be resolved. Further, processes of 
management of conflicts should be detailed. 
 
iii) Promoting the Code through collabouration: encourages institutional investor to consider 
a collabourative approach, where appropriate, to promote acceptance and implementation 
of the Principles of this Code and other applicable codes and standards applicable to 
institutional shareholders. 
 
iv) Disclosure: requires institutional investors to fully disclosure to stakeholders the policies 
put into place in line with this Code, the implementation of these policies, and the general 
application of this Code. 
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5.3.1 Investment Screening 
 
There was no direct reference to negative screening among respondents. With positive screening, 
though not explicit, trade union demands that pension funds include in their portfolios companies 
that display key principles which underlie the Social Responsible Investments (SRI) such as 
infrastructure development and social services, Broad base Black Economic Empowerment 
funding, environmental preservation and community development (COSATU, 1997).  
 
The Government Employees‘ Pension Fund (GEPF), for example, has directed the Isibaya Fund 
to play a defining role in supporting the national development agenda. Thus, this fund is placed 
in unlisted investments with a focus on job creation, job retention, poverty alleviation, BBBEE 
transformation and regional development. GEPF has also developed an ESG framework to 
measure the performance of this fund (Public Investment Corporation Annual Report, 2010).  
 
5.3.2 Community Investment  
 
With regards to community investment, the observation of the study was that fund managers 
were integrating social and governance (ESG) issues in investment decision-making. For 
example, Old Mutual‘s Community Property Fund has been providing funds for the development 
of retail shopping centres catering to the needs of underserviced communities throughout the 
country. At present, the Fund has invested in the development of over 30 shopping centres in 
rural and townships in eight of the nine provinces of South Africa. These centres are providing 
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retail services and products to a primary target market of approximately 8 million low- to 
middle-income groups. Additionally, the fund is benefiting in terms of rental income from 
national leases of these centres.  The following are the retail facilities catering to lower-income 
households (Old Mutual, n.d.): 
 
 Sontongo Mall – Gauteng 
 Megacity – North West Province 
 Nkomazi Plaza - Mpumalanga 
 Thulamahashe Plaza – Limpopo 
 Kanyamazane Mall - Mpumalanga 
 
Housing Impact Fund is another Old Mutual asset allocation with SRI elements. This fund 
invests in low cost housing and ancillary projects with the objective of alleviating the plight of 
the previously advantaged by focusing on housing delivery, housing finance and channelling 
assets into investments which plug the gap in housing. 
 
Apart from development related investments, Old Mutual has a Social Impact Fund. This fund is 
directed mainly at women‘s empowerment to address gender inequality and poverty alleviation. 
According to a respondent: 
 
―The money is used as fund money to small groups of women who want to go 
into business who would not get money from the bank under normal 
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circumstances because of their credit ratings. We give them access to funding 
as well as training. We don‘t just give them money. We give them money and 
make sure we train them. We also give them access to the market. Because 
remember as an individual you cannot go and negotiate a deal with 
Woolworths. But as a Fund of our stature, can talk to Woolworth that we have 
got people that are canning food and we would like to put them on your store‘s 
suppliers list. We have got the muscle to negotiate with Woolworth more than 
you as an individual. So that‘s the space that we are also playing here‖ 
(PAT03). 
 
GEPF has also reorganized its Isibaya Fund strategy, administered by PIC, to focus on 
investments with measurable social and developmental impact. Consequently, the Isibaya Fund 
will explicitly address GEPF‘s developmental investment strategy focusing on four main 
investment themes (Public Investment Corporation Limited, 2010 Annual Report): 
 
i) Economic infrastructure, including infrastructure for energy, logistics, water, broadband 
and commuter transport; 
ii) Social infrastructure, focusing on health, education, housing and development finance; 
iii) Economic growth investments in sectors that foster growth, job creation and broad-based 
black economic empowerment particularly in those priority sectors identified by 
government‘s Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), including agriculture, agro-
processing, alternative energy and environmental projects; and  
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iv) Dinamane, to focus on microfinance and investment in small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMMEs). 
 
Similar trends were observed in other funds. The Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund and 
Mine Employees Pension Fund are committed to a broad-based BEE policy through a range of 
operating activities intended to ensure transformation at all levels of society (Sentinel Mining 
Industry Retirement Fund, 2009 Annual Report; Mine Employees‘ Pension Fund, 2009 Annual 
Report). The following are the main vehicles being used in this regard: 
 
 A Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) strategy that allocates a set percentage of 
total assets to target appropriate SRI projects and investments. 
 An incubation programme focusing on emerging black asset and investment 
managers who have the potential to add value to the Fund‘s portfolios and who would 
not be otherwise identified in the Fund‘s standard institutional investment manager 
research process. 
 Service providers to the Fund, including asset managers, must be committed to the 
transformational goals of the Codes of Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment. 
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5.3.3 Economically Targeted Investment  
 
In terms of economically targeted investment, there were no specific investments marked as 
such. However, a critical look at the composition of some asset allocations indicates that the 
massive investments in infrastructure development, both economic and social provide financial 
opportunities for institutional investors. In the end, the communities benefit in terms of better 
infrastructure, community revitalization and job creation. According to one fund manager: 
 
―…the owners of the money will still get the investment returns and the 
community will get something tangible. Even the investors will see that there is a 
hospital here, for example. These are the kinds of things that we try to resolve 
through this kind of program. We have got high unemployment, so when we start 
building a shopping mall; we create employment for locals there‖ (PAT03). 
 
Of course, the first priority for fund managers is investments that could give them a good rate of 
return, which might probably result in community betterment. As one fund manager asserted: 
 
We are not saying doing social things is not to the best interest of the fund. We 
must make sure, as a fund, that we what do is in the best interest of the fund and it 
might turn out to also have a social benefit (PAT02). 
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At the same time as there have been these developments in the pension industries, it cannot be 
argued that they have been due to solely trade unions‘ role in influencing institutional investors 
in using their funds in the economic and social sectors for the benefit of workers and 
communities. Some fund managers did not see any particular role that unions play on the pension 
fund board apart from representing the interest of the fund. 
 
For me I would not say that the union trustees have a particular role to play on 
the board. I think they bring diversity to the board. And they bring the 
necessary balance and checks. Because once you have got people who come 
from different backgrounds looking at the same problem, invariably they will 
come up with …solution to solve it. So you actually increase your capacity to 
interrogate issues better and manage the fund effectively. I think that is the 
angle they bring in. (PAT02) 
 
While it is tempting to argue that there have been these massive developments have brought 
positive benefits to workers and their communities, trade unions contend that the impact has not 
been satisfactory.  
 
―Let me be honest with you, as a union we are not satisfied with the current 
configuration of the SRI because it is not having any maximum impact on the 
society. Our view is our pension fund, if you look at the distribution and the 
investment of that money, it is being s invested into affluent societies where the 
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middle class live. We are saying, we want to see the impact of those monies on 
the social programmes and development such as development of skills of 
farmers and development of scarce skill, investment to properties…‖ (PAT05). 
 
5.4  Contributions of trade unions in strengthening pension fund governance 
 
In evaluating the trade union role in influencing pension fund governance, the focus is on the 
extent to which the unions are able to support shareholder campaigns to influence corporate 
governance in the pension industry.  
 
Across all respondents, there was an agreement that the pension industry was challenged with 
malpractices. Corruption and conflicts of interests were cited as compromising the fiduciary 
responsibilities and consequently affecting the benefit of the members. 
 
―I think service providers know that this is a wealthy industry and trustees know 
that this is a wealth industry and sometimes it opens up doors for corruptive 
elements. And you do see this occurring all the time where the service providers 
who want to get into the fund would offer soft payment to boards of trustees to 
members of trustees‖ (PAT01). 
 
Another respondent stated that: 
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Our industry is challenged in the sense that by now there is quite a lot of 
corruption. People don‘t see the value of what you are ….with if you don‘t have a 
budget for bribery. Because we don‘t have a budget it‘s a challenge. You can see 
that people understand what you are selling and they like it but they will not go 
with it. And you wonder why they are not going with it. Only to find that there is 
something lacking there. Those are the challenges and sometimes ……the 
decision making process is too long‖ (PAT03). 
 
In the case of corporate governance, investment strategies of all the funds visited complied with 
FSB PF 130. The investment strategies addressed among other things shareholder activism/proxy 
voting. Accordingly, the study found that PIC has been using the matrix to rate the ESG 
disclosure practices of the top 40 companies listed on the JSE. Furthermore, PIC attends and vote 
at the Annual General Meetings of investee companies, and its voting record is published on the 
Corporation‘s website for stakeholders‘ information. For the period 2009/10, the main issues 
monitored were ―board independence, attendance of board meetings, excessive remuneration, 
retrospective approval of board fees, blank authority to keep shares under direct control and 
blank authority to issue shares for cash‖ (PIC 2010 Annual Report).  However, the performance 
on social and environmental remains to be considered. 
 
COSATU and its affiliates have acknowledged PIC‘s work on corporate governance and proxy 
voting.  Resolutions tabled at the COSATU annual congress indicate that PIC policies and 
principles were progressive. COSATU, therefore, has resolved to continue strengthening its 
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relationship with PIC and other funds to enhance proxy voting and Corporate Governance. 
Accordingly, COSATU has adopted the following PIC principles as well policies and 
applications to adapt them to its situation (COSATU Resolution of 10 National Congress, 1999):  
 
i) Discipline: proper behavior of senior managers 
ii) Transparency: ensuring that outsiders have the power to view and thus assess corporate 
philosophies and actions. 
iii) Independence: the entrenchment of actions and balances of power in corporate structures. 
iv) Accountability: the mechanism to expose policies, decisions and actions to investor 
scrutiny 
v) Behavior: the ability to correct actions where necessary 
vi) Fairness 
vii) Social Responsibility: good co-operative citizenship, non exploitative and responsible 
actions in relations to environmental and human right issues. 
viii) Good stakeholder relations: the ultimate aim of conserving the repository of value 
represented. 
 
It remains to be seen to what extent trade union have customized these principles and policies to 
influence corporate governance in the pension industry.  
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5.4 Enhancing trade union influence and control of pension fund investments  
 
Enhancing trade union influence and control of pension fund investments requires a union clear 
agenda for their representative. This strategy involves the development of labour-centric training 
programmes and the creation of networks of labour activists and other labour trustees around 
pension issues. This clear agenda will include among other things recruitment and selection 
process, training and support for the labour trustees. 
 
5.5.1 Trade union policy 
 
The study did not found a documented policy on the pension fund for the unions at the national 
level. Instead the unions were guided by the resolutions that had been passed at the union 
congress (PAT05). It was not possible to evaluate the implementation of these resolutions.  
 
However, it was observed that there were many fragmented funds in the industry, especially in 
the mining sector. Therefore, in order to influence the investments some suggested strategies 
included consolidating all the funds into one big fund. 
 
―….because we have got many funds in the mining, which are fragment, we 
want to consolidate into a one strong big fund at the central level, the likes of 
PIC. That‘s the route that we want to take…. consolidation of the all fund into 
one big fund so that we can be able to influence the investment‖ (PAT05).  
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5.5.2 Selection of Trustees 
 
The Pension Fund Act provides that trustees must be elected and be appointed into the fund. The 
appointment after selection is regulated by PF circular 130 of the Financial Services Board. 
However, with permission from FSB, large funds with many participants opt to appoint trustee 
due to logistical in organizing elections for trustees.  
 
The study observed that the appointment of trustees in a union is by identifying shop stewards 
who have the potential to understand the industry itself, that is, financial or pension fund 
industry. When they are identified, the National Executive Council (NEC) will then endorse the 
appointment.  
 
5.5.3 Training of Trustees 
 
The study found that some of the trustees knew nothing about pension fund investment when 
appointed to the board of trustees. Therefore, ―employer‘s trustees are the ones running the 
funds. They dictate the trajectory of the fund, in terms of where to invest and so on‖ (PAT05)  
 
In line with the PF 130, however, new board members receive training ―to enable them to 
minimize their risk of liability as well as safeguard them against bad decision- making‖. 
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The study also found that some unions invest in trustee capacity building. ―We do have 
programmes where trustees are taken for training. These provided by professional institutions. 
They provides with lessons on how to invest, portfolio management, etc. Trustees are taken 
through basic education of investment. So far, we have trained more than 300 trustees‖ (PAT04). 
 
There was appreciation that when many trustees get educated and they understand what the law 
requires of them and what their fiduciary duty, they avoid being liable. (PAT01). 
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Chapter Six – Analysis of the Research Findings  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter critically analyses research findings. The chapter is organized into seven main 
sections.  The second section analyses the impact of the legal frame on trade unions‘ 
participation in pension fund management. The third section analyses the extent of trade unions 
in promoting the interest of pension fund members in South Africa.  The fourth section analyses 
the impact of the legal framework on the extent of trade unions‘ in influencing pension fund 
investments in sectors that would benefit the workers and their communities in South Africa. The 
fifth section analyses trade unions‘ contribution to strengthening pension fund governance.  The 
sixth section offers sustainable strategies for enhancing trade unions‘ influence and control of 
pension fund investments. The seventh section concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Analysis of the impact of the legal frame on trade unions 
 
The study confirms that the legal framework limits trade unions‘ participation in the 
management of pension fund. According the PF 130, trustees irrespective of whether they are 
employer-appointed or members-elected owe a primary duty of care to the fund and the members 
and beneficiaries  and  not specifically accountable to or required to disclose any information to 
that group of persons or entities through whom they were appointed or elected as a board 
members. As one fund manager posits, ―the role for the union just goes as far establishing the 
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board of labour trustees is concerned. However, when it comes to how fund are to be invested, 
that becomes the role of the trustees. So there is no role of the employer, members or the trade 
union in the management of the funds. That is the role of the trustees‖ (PAT08).  
 
This is clearly evident in the PPWAWU NATIONAL PROVIDENT FUND  vs Chemical, 
Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) case
vi
, where the 
union decided to remove trustees from the board for refusing to follow its mandate.  However, 
the trustees were reinstated by the courts stating that the pension fund trustees are independent. 
 
Apparently, the fund in question was established through negotiation between the union and the 
employer, which later merged with other trade unions. In March 2002, the trustees decided to 
terminate the mandate of the fund‘s existing administrators and to appoint different 
administrators. This decision was not welcomed by the union. Therefore, at its congress held in 
August 2002, the union adopted a ―Resolution on the accountability of fund trustees established 
by CEPPWAWU‖.  According to the judgment, the resolution sought to impose obligations on 
trustees elected or appointed by the union or its members to manage benefit funds established by 
the union. 
 
Some of the resolutions included the following (PPWAWU NATIONAL PROVIDENT FUND 
vs CEPPWAWU Judgment): 
 
 That the shop steward Trustees are accountable to union members who elected them. 
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 That the shop steward trustees must therefore take mandates from union members of the 
funds on all matters that affect them. 
 That the NEC must give guidance on policy matters to the member trustees and the 
investment company. 
 That the Worker trustees are accountable to the union and the members of the funds who 
elected them. 
 That the employee trustees therefore must take mandates from the union before and after 
they attend board of trustees meetings and the members of the funds on all matters that 
will affect them before they attend board of trustees meetings. 
 That all trustees who fail to adhere to these fundamental democratic principles (which 
form the basis of CEPPWAWU) must be disciplined in terms of the union‘s constitution 
and its policies. 
 The NEC should ensure that the two Benefit Funds be amalgamated as soon as possible. 
 The NEC should ensure that regular elections are held to renew the mandate of benefit 
fund trustees. 
 The NEC must develop a paper on the role of the funds in the context of the Pension 
Fund Act and the union‘s investment policy. 
 
However, on 16 March 2006, trustees unanimously resolved to amend certain aspects of the rules 
that would weaken the control which the union had over the appointment of members‘ trustees 
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The decision by the trustees to amend the rule was objected to by the union. Accordingly, the 
union charged its seven (7) trustees with three (3) charges (PPWAWU NATIONAL 
PROVIDENT FUND vs CEPPWAWU Judgment):  
 
1. The union found the trustees guilty of misconduct for failing to inform the NEC of such 
 amendments to the rules of the PNPF.  
2. The union found the trustees guilty of misconduct for participating in a meeting where 
 the PNPF Rules were amended, without any mandate from the fund members and/or 
 union  constitutional structures.  
3. The union found the trustees guilty of misconduct in that, after participating in the 
 meeting where a resolution amending the rules of the PNPF was adopted, they failed to 
 inform the union that the amendments had been affected.  
 
As such trustees contravened the CEPPWAWU 1
st
 National Congress resolution on the 
accountability of trustees of benefit funds established by the union, and the constitutional 
provisions of the union. 
 
 In his answering affidavit on behalf of the union, Mr W Nolingo, the union‘s general secretary, 
states as follows: 
 
―Rule Amendment 9 has had the effect of removing CEPPWAWU‘s 
representation on the board without any consultation having been conducted 
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with it prior thereto. This I submit is untenable, given that the large majority of 
the members of the Fund are CEPPWAWU members. The manner  in 
which this amendment was effected was contrary to the spirit if not the letter of 
the Rules as they existed prior to the amendment. It was for these reasons that 
CEPPWAWU objected to the Rule Amendment‖ (PPWAWU NATIONAL 
PROVIDENT FUND vs CEPPWAWU Judgment). 
 
The contention of the fund was that the resolution was invalid and that it was unlawful for the 
union to pursue disciplinary charges founded on the resolution (PPWAWU NATIONAL 
PROVIDENT FUND vs CEPPWAWU Judgment): 
 
A fund trustee who complies with all union mandates in the exercise of his or her 
powers as trustee whether or not he or she believes that the mandated positions 
are in the best interests of the Fund and its members will be in breach of his or 
her duties to the Fund and its members. 
 
Persons who have fiduciary duties to fulfil (and these include retirement fund 
trustees) are not the agents of those who appoint them, do not derive their powers 
from those persons (instead they derive their powers from the ‗trust instrument‘ 
such as, in the case of a trustee of a retirement fund, from the Fund‘s Rules) and 
cannot lawfully bind themselves to exercise their discretion in a particular way. 
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Mr Watt Pringle, who appeared on behalf of the fund, submitted that the resolution is contrary to 
law and/or to public policy and is accordingly invalid and unenforceable. In essence, his 
argument was that each trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the fund; that the resolution seeks to 
interfere with the proper exercise of that fiduciary duty in an unlawful manner; and that this 
renders the resolution illegal, contrary to public policy and unenforceable. 
 
Section 7C (1) makes it clear that – by statute it is the fund‘s board, and not the union, which is 
entitled and required to ―direct, control and oversee‖ the fund‘s operations. The assertion in the 
resolution (―noting‖ clause 3) that, on occasion, the union‘s NEC and other constitutional 
structures ―take decisions‖ on benefit funds which the trustees ―are obliged to implement‖ is 
incompatible with this statutory injunction. In my view, the union‘s misconception in regard 
to this issue was fundamental and led it to adopt a resolution some of the terms of which are 
incompatible with the requirements of the PFA and the fiduciary duties of the fund‘s trustees. 
 
The Judge held that the union was wrong in believing that the members‘ trustees are 
―accountable to‖ it and had no right to require such trustees to be ―accountable to‖ it and its 
members. The union had no right to impose an obligation on the members‘ trustees to ―take 
mandates‖ from the union before and after they attend board meetings nor to oblige them to 
―take mandates from union members‖. 
 
The Judge accepted that there is nothing unlawful or improper in the union expressing its views 
on issues to be decided by the fund‘s trustees or even in seeking to persuade the fund‘s trustees 
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to accept its views. However, it is, in his view, unlawful for the union to seek to compel member 
trustees to ―take mandates‖ which they are required to implement, failing which they risk 
disciplinary steps. It is unlawful for the union to threaten disciplinary steps against member 
trustees for refusing to accept that they are ―accountable to‖ and union and its members, rather 
than to the fund and its members. 
 
In his view, the resolution in this case is contrary to public policy and unlawful because it seeks 
to interfere with the rights of pension fund trustees to exercise their fiduciary duties in 
accordance with their own independent judgment. 
 
This case suggests a tension between the financial industry and the union on the management of 
pension affairs. It has also put a wedge between trade unions and their trustees. As one 
respondent stated, ―we have some extent control over the trustees. However, we don‘t have 
direct control given the fiduciary duty. They have some freedom but at the same time we remind 
them to observe the policies and guidelines of the union‖ (PAT04).  
 
OPSEU has dealt with a similar a situation and has gained some level of control over its labour 
trustees.  According to OPSEU, it has been able to get through ―the "chill" that has existed 
between unions and their trustees as a result of the Cowan and Scargill case‖. OPSEU 
―acknowledges that trustees - as fiduciaries - are not independent agents, but are accountable to 
both plan members and the union‖. Potential trustees are made aware of the union‘s expectation 
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trustees will follow union policy on pension issues such as ―training, attendance, expense and 
conflict of interest policies, codes of conduct and all other policies of the union‖ (OPSEU, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, OPSEU requires a potential trustee to ―commit in writing that they are prepared to 
follow union policies‖ before that person is accepted to be a union trustee.  We read: ―While 
trustees may not be legally the agents of the union all trustees know that they are expected to 
assert the Union's agenda‖. This forms the basis on which the union is able ―to support and train 
trustees for their work on pension boards‖. However, OPSEU would not hesitate to remove any 
union appointed trustee from the board, ―in the event that they fail to perform their duties, the 
Union has a responsibility to remove them‖ (OPSEU, 2002).  
 
Through its Pension Liaison Committee, OPSEU has continued to recommend ―policies and 
procedures for union-nominated trustees‖. These policies would include ― monitoring trustee 
conduct in line with OPSEU's goals, interviewing prospective trustees, determining education 
needs and facilitating communication between the union, membership and trustees‖ (OPSEU, 
2002).  
 
6.3 Analysis of the extent of trade unions in promoting the interest of pension fund 
members  
 
According to Weststar and Verma, ―those unions that have achieved a seat have largely 
stalemated at the second stage with only a few achieving some impact on the governance of 
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pensions in terms of socially responsible investment (SRI), economically targeted investment 
(ETI) or the leverage of shareholder proxy votes to promote corporate good governance and 
other outcomes‖ (2007: 12). This seems to be case of most trade unions in South Africa. While 
they have able to joint trusteeship of most of the funds, they have failed to break through the 
―chill‖ of fiduciary requirements of trustee to advance labour perspective though their union 
appointed trustees. According to Weststar and Verma, ―labour trustees must be able to challenge 
the traditional models of pension investment and governance‖ if they are to achieve these ends. 
Or else, ―they risk becoming token members of the board‖ (2007: 12). 
 
6.4 Analysis of extent of trade unions’ influence on pension fund investment decisions  
 
Investment Screening 
 
The results show that pension funds are directing investments to companies with ―positive social 
goal‖ or ―with more general ethical objectives‖ (Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter 2003: 6). 
The SRI Equity Fund of Old Mutual, for example, is based on the SRI principles of the JSE SRI 
Index and includes listed companies that integrate corporate social responsibility and 
performance with business activities. The General Equity Fund, is another example, that invests 
in JSE-listed companies that are ―viable and sustainable, and have a clear commitment to job 
creation, skills development, affirmative action, sound environmental practices and effective 
corporate governance‖. 
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The OPSEU policy paper on pension (2002), reports that screens can be responsive to the 
concerns of pension plan members if monitored over a long period of time. The OPSEU policy 
paper, however, warns that financial impact is not necessarily felt by the companies who are 
screened out (2002: 52), unless it is done collectively by a large number of pension funds. The 
study confirms that many small funds with uncoordinated programs on, especially, in the mining 
sector cannot exert pressure to change corporate governance if they operate in isolation.  
 
Community Investment  
 
The emphasis of community investing and economically targeted in South Africa has been on 
reconstruction given the legacy of apartheid. The study noted that most of the initiatives are 
designed to meet these goals.  For example the Financial Sector Charter Council‘s goal is ―to 
actively promote a transformed, vibrant and globally competitive financial sector that reflects the 
demographics of South Africa and contributes to the establishment of an equitable society by 
effectively providing accessible financial services to black people and by directing investment 
into targeted sectors of the economy‖ (FSCC, 2008 Annual Report). A critical analysis of the 
investment allocation with regard to these programs, it is difficult to distinguish between 
community investing and economically targeted investments.  Therefore, most of the community 
investments are considered as targeted investments. 
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Economically Targeted Investment  
 
Economically targeted investment is a form of social investment that targets a certain amount of 
assets for specific social goals such as employment opportunities, provide affordable housing, 
urban revitalization, support of small and medium sized enterprises, renewable energy, and clean 
technology (Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter 2003; Hebb and Beeferman 2008). Table 7 
below shows the amount of funds that were allocated for economically targeted investments in 
underdeveloped and previously marginalised areas of South Africa.  This is according to the 
stated principles of the Financial Services and Property Charters, whose goal is to actively 
promote a transformed and vibrant financial sector and contribute to the establishment of an 
equitable society by effectively providing accessible financial services to black people and by 
directing investment into targeted sectors of the economy (FSCC Annual Report 2008).  
 
In low-income housing, for example, targeted investments were targeted at R 41.8 billion to be 
achieved by 2008. However, only R 32 billion of the target was achieved. 
 
Table 7: Targeted Investment Performance 2005 - 2008 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Low-Income Housing (R-m) 13,269 
        
25,705  
       
26,761  
        
31,135  
Black SME (R-m) 6,214 
          
9,840  
        
8,802  
        
11,368  
Agriculture (R-m) 201 604 
        
3,057  
          
4,441  
Transformational Infrastructure (R-m) 4,290 
          
9,115  
       
12,469  
        
17,688  
Source: The Financial Sector Charter Council, Annual Report 2008 
104 
 
 
Figure 1 below shows that Black SME‘s and Agriculture was financed to over 200 percent of the 
original target. However, there was no information to verify the impact of these investments to 
the beneficiaries. 
 
Figure 1: Targeted Investments 2008 
 
Source: The Financial Sector Charter Council, Annual Report 2008 
 
According to FSCC, however, targeted investments would only be achieved if there is a 
―partnership between the financial sector and government to effect risk-sharing between 
government and banks to facilitate the transformation of the low-income housing market, as well 
as risk mitigation in areas of non-commercial risk‖ (FSCC Annual Report, 2008). This is 
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consistent with Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter‘s  assertion that investment in economically 
targeted investment is supported by regulations that defines collateral benefits of ETIs as well as 
―guarantee of government funding so that pension funds can be used for urban redevelopment‖ 
(Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter 2003). 
 
According to OPSEU policy paper on pension, for pension fund capital to be used more 
productively, investment vehicles and expertise have to be connected with pension trustees.  The 
policy paper emphasises that social goals may not be realised ―without more collaboration 
between pension funds on social investment strategies with labour sponsored investment funds‖ 
(OPSEU, 2002). This could be a possible explanation why the South African trade union 
movement is not having an impact on the control of pension fund investments.  
 
The Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec offers a good example of economic development 
by pension funds in Canada (Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter, 2003). As Carmichael, 
Thompson and Quarter (2003) write, Québec‘s pension and benefits funds as well as the Québec 
Pension Plan invest in Caisse. As at 1997, Caisse had net assets of $63.6 billion, making it one of 
largest investment agency in Canada (Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter, 2003).  
Labour-sponsored investment funds (LSIFs), is another economic development initiatives of the 
trade union movement in Canada and, in North America and Europe (Carmichael, Thompson 
and Quarter, 2003). According to Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter, pension funds that want 
to put a small part of their funds to regional venture capital could use LSIFs as an investment 
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vehicle. LSIFs had assets of almost $4 billion in 1998(Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter, 
2003). 
Concert Properties, a real estate development company in British Columbia, and its sister 
investment vehicle, Mortgage Fund One, are both funded by about 26 pension funds 
shareholders (Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter, 2003). According to Carmichael, Thompson 
and Quarter, Mortgage Fund One and Concert Properties are good cases of ―multisector 
collabouration across labour and employer groups‖ (Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter, 2003). 
 
The AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust has public sector pension funds such as CalPERS, 
NYCERS and Mass PRIM as investors (Hebb and Beeferman, 2008). There are many other good 
examples of labour-friendly investment vehicles that have worked in collabouration with pension 
funds to deliver economically targeted investments.  
 
In view of the above, the study agrees with COSATU‘s call for the trade union movement in 
South Africa ―to review the potential for using existing union investment companies to create 
and finance a vibrant co-operative sector‖ (COSATU, n.d.: ), in ―A Growth Path Towards Full 
Employment document. In particular, further research must be undertaken to explore the extent 
to which workers‘ funds held by union investment companies, the pension fund industry and 
retirement funds, cannot be consolidated to create a progressive developmental investment 
vehicle (COSATU, n.d.).  
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6.5 Analysis of trade unions contribution to strengthening pension fund governance 
 
There was evidence of shareholder activism in PIC, the investment company for GEPF. PIC 
periodically produces public voting patterns of its proxy votes that are available on its website. 
However, others claim that ―there are relatively few instances where shareholders in South 
Africa have actively challenged corporate management, voted out directors, or passed resolutions 
to facilitate changes in company policy‖ (NALEDI, Policy Bulletin August 2002). According to 
Frater, ―shareholders‘ meetings in South Africa are comparatively lonely events, with the main 
participants and voters being the company directors‖ (NALEDI, Policy Bulletin August 2002). 
 
However, one report on Responsible Investments in South Africa cites Unity Incorporation, an 
investment group cofounded by unions, as having attempted ―to transform the companies in 
which their pension funds were invested by raising issues of concern to workers, especially 
working conditions (Giamporcaro, Pretorius and Visser, 2010). 
 
Hebb and Beeferman (2008: 7) highlights recent initiatives undertaken to advance a long-term 
view of value  by the American umbrella labour organizations such as the AFL-CIO and Change 
to Win (CtW) unions, among others, ―to fight over excessive executive compensation, board 
composition and access to the proxy ballot for nomination of directors‘ to corporate boards‖.  
 
6.6  Current practices of enhancing trade union control of pension fund investments  
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Trade Unions’ Policy on Pension Fund Governance 
 
Weststar and Verma observe that ―since their goals in pension governance remain unclear, most 
unions do not appear to have a formal process to identify and develop their own talent in this 
area‖ (2007: 4). Indeed a case can be made that unions in South Africa had no clear policy on 
pension fund governance looking at the content of their resolutions with regard to pension fund 
governance. Most of them were responding to a particular issue at that point in time. Thus, this 
situation defeats unions‘ efforts to effectively influence investment decisions, which are 
dominated by the financial industry.  One respondent observed that trade unions were falling 
short in exercising their clout optimally. This is despite unions having huge influence over the 
sector due to the size of their membership. The respondent felt strongly that unions could 
consolidate their position and become a real force in the pension industry.   
 
OPSEU for example has developed consistent union policy and objectives with respect to control 
of pension plans.  The policy outlines the union approach to ―accountability of trustees, expense 
allowances, procedures for appointments, removal of trustees, and trustee training‖ (OPSEU, 
2002: 24).  The end result is that OPSEU has been able to negotiate pension plans over which it 
had some control. The union has also been able to deal with its relationship with its trustees in 
relation to conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the union has been able to carry out social 
investment initiatives that are in line with the interests of their members and their communities 
(OPSEU Policy paper on pension, 2002). It can be concluded, therefore, that a clear policy on 
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pension fund governance would help unions in South Africa to take a proactive position pension 
fund matters. 
  
Selection of trustees 
 
Section 7A (1) of the PFA, requires that at least 50 percent membership of a board of a fund to 
be elected by the members of the fund. The selection procedures for labour trustees can take 
many forms. Weststar and Verma report that the union can appoint labour trustees or their 
representatives ―from outside of the union, recommended by the union but officially appointed 
by the government or the plan itself, elected by plan participants, or selected by the union‖ 
(2007: 16).  
 
One of the unions in the study appoints its trustees by identifying shop stewards who have the 
―potential of understand the pension industry or the financial industry. The identified candidates 
are then endorsed by the National Executive Council (NEC). This process resonates with 
Quarter‘s observation that ―most labour trustees have a history of being active in their union – 
sometimes even on pension and benefits committees - rather than being selected or elected as a 
raw recruit from the rank and file‖ (Quarter et al. 2008 cited in Verma and Weststar, 2011). 
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Training of trustees 
 
From the evidence tendered, it is clear that more needs to be done with regard to the training of 
labour trustees if they are to move forward labour perspectives on the pension fund investment 
decisions. COSATU acknowledges that ―trustees‘ knowledge on matters of pension fund is very 
limited and therefore they completely rely on service providers for expert advice‖ (COSATU, 
n.d). 
 
The PF 130 provide that ―new board members, at the expense of the fund, post appointment and 
election, receive rigorous and comprehensive training on both the legislation and regulatory 
framework and governance principles in order to equip them to effectively carry out their 
functions as board members, and to enable them to minimize their risk of liability as well as 
safeguard them against bad decision- making‖. 
 
The PF 130 also requires that ―board members be educated on an ongoing basis about new 
matters relating to funds to ensure that they acquire and maintain an understanding of risk 
management, investment risks and strategies, benefit structures, legal issues, regulatory and 
compliance requirements, taxation, actuarial and reform issues‖. 
 
While specific targeted training is being offered by asset managers, it is the case that training is 
―bias towards the service providers instead of focusing on members interests‖ (COSATU, n.d).  
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In other words, training provided by the financial industry put emphasis on the ―high levels of 
accountability expected of union trustees‖ (Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter 2003).  
 
In one study interviewee describe courses as ―short and introductory‖ (Weststar and Verma, 
2007). According to Weststar and Verman these ―these courses typically cater to pension trustees 
or board members in general and do not address some of the needs specific to labour trustees 
such as reconciling their role or bringing forth alternative perspectives‖ (Weststar and Verma 
2007). 
 
Carmichael et al report that unions and trustees who are keen to broaden their perspective 
towards investment are not receiving much support from their pension funds (Carmichael and 
Quarter, 2003).  Admittedly, even trade unions‘ education departments are not in a position to 
provide training to trustees and union leadership on pension matters (COSATU, n.d), especially 
alternative investments.  
 
Carmichael (1998) cited in Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter (2003: 2) suggested ―that 
education could be a critical factor in preparing union and other employee representatives to take 
an active role in pension fund investment‖. As Rudd and Spalding (1997) contend, if appropriate 
education was given to trustees, they would be encouraged to place pension funds in 
economically targeted investments, which have collateral benefits such as job creation for 
working people (cited in Carmichael, Thompson and Quarter 2003:2).  
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From the above, it is, therefore, suggested that potential labour trustees or representative should 
have acquired this kind of education prior to their appointment in order to take an active role in 
pension fund investment. As Weststar and Verma write, ―labour trustees will be more effective 
members of the pension plan board of trustees if they arrive at the table with a clearly defined 
role, a well articulated purpose, and sufficient support through training and social networks‖ 
(2007: 30). 
 
In line with the above assertion, a member of the Pensions at Work Union Reference Group put 
forth a suggestion that a pool of plan members be identified, based on interest or ability or both, 
and be trained in pension issues. The motivation is that new trustees would be selected or elected 
from this pool whenever a labour trustees‘ position falls vacant (Weststar and Verma, 2007: 17). 
This is a cadre of labour trustees who would have developed ―their own body of knowledge on 
capital markets and pension fund investment strategies‖, based on a union agenda ―on the 
perspectives and interests of working people and their communities‖ (Carmichael, Thompson 
and Quarter 2003: 3) independent of the financial industry. 
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Chapter Seven – Summary and Conclusions 
 
The  study  investigated  the  role  of  trade  unions  in  pension  fund  investment  management  
in South Africa with the focus on assessing the extent to which they have been able to promote 
and protect the interest of pension fund members and direct pension fund investment in areas that 
would have a positive impact on the working families and their communities. 
 
The implication of this study suggests a conflict. On  one  hand,  it  was  observed  that  pension 
governance and  developments  in  the regulatory framework continue  to  push  the  trustees 
towards  the  greatest  possible  degree  of  independence and  away from the influence of any 
appointing party. This framework does not allow space for union participation in the pension 
fund management.  At  the  same  time  pressures  from  the  imperatives  of  the  United Nations 
backed Principles of Responsible Investing (UNPRI),  ILO‘s  international labour standards 
aimed at ensuring that growth on the economy provides benefits for all and now King III, which 
sets the tone  for corporate governance practices in South Africa. 
 
In  the  circumstances, the   study   finds  that  the hegemonic influence over  pension fund 
investment  issues  by  the  financial  industry  has  been  significant.  It  has  determined  on  
which  side  of  the  balance  the  weight  of  the investment  policy  is  placed.  As  such,  there  
was  observed  a  series  of  concerted  and  mutually  reinforcing  steps  towards  limiting trade 
union influence in pension fund management and  the  reduction  of  the  scope  and  coverage  of  
fiduciary mandate. However, this  study  finds  that  labour representation on the pension boards 
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of trustees still  remains  the  major  determinant  of  the long-term interests of workers, their 
families and their communities. Thus,  the  balance  sheet  at  the  moment   shows  that  the  
development  of  pension fund investment strategies  in  South Africa  has  gone  hand  in  hand  
with   a  continuing  presence  of   the  trade  union trustees   on  pension boards.  In other   
words, the  evidence  of  labour representation in various subcommittees of  pension funds 
through the presence of union trustees was  observed. 
 
This  study  also  revealed  that  trade  union  participation in  pension  fund  investment in  South 
Africa  has  not  been  without  difficulties. Most  fundamentally,  the  study  reports  that  
commitment  expected  of  trade unions  within  the  framework  of  the  joint trusteeship  of 
pension fund management  has  not  been  fully realized.  On  the  contrary, the  failure  of  
financial industry   to  win  the  trust  and  confidence of   pension fund   members  and their 
community that they could be solely entrusted  with the management of pension fund affairs in 
their long-term interests,  would  appear  to  have  reinforced  stakeholders‘  high  regard for the  
relevance  of  the  trade  union movement.  However, the  positive  respondents‘  evaluation  of  
the  contribution  made  by  trustees  was  found  not  to  be  dependent  on  whether they were 
labour or employer trustees, suggesting  that  the  role  of  the  trade  union trustees were  
considered  invaluable  by  the majority  of  participants.  Nevertheless,  the  evidence  of  
minimal   control  of  pension fund  by unions was  significant  and  pointed  to  the legal 
limitation and lack of clear policy on pension fund governance. However, this did render trade 
unions ineffective or irrelevant with regard to their role in promoting the interest of members and 
directing pension fund in social investments. 
115 
 
 
A  critical  look  at  the  challenges  facing  the  labour movement in taking control  of  pension 
fund investment in South Africa  informed  the  need  for   the  union  to  adopt a  more  
transformative educational  agenda  reinforced  by  a  more  workers‘ friendly investment  
strategy. Thus, it  was  suggested  that  a  sustainable  trade  union   strategy  must  build  on: i) 
providing support to trustees through research and education,  ii) getting  more  involved  in  
projects that provide direct benefits to members of the fund, iii) work in partnership with their 
pension fund, iv) collabourate with labour investment fund and connect expertise in social 
investing to trustees and fund managers, and; v) advancing  a  worker friendly investment 
strategy.  
 
Based  on  the  evidence  of  this  study,  I   have  no  doubt  therefore  that   trade  unions  in 
South Africa  can leverage the power of the workers‘ capital to benefit workers and their 
communities.  My conviction is  that  fiduciary obligation of trustees  and  investment strategies 
that takes into account economic, governance and social issues are  potentially  compatible  and  
potentially  beneficial.  The success of the unions‘ participation in pension fund management and 
influencing investment decision-making,  however,  will  chiefly depend  on  whether  they  have 
clear  policies and goals on pension fund governance and are able to initiate a process of 
engagement.  In  effect,  the  trade union movement in South African trade, ―one of the most 
well-organized labour movements in the developing world‖ (Pillay, 2003)  is  at  the  cross  
roads. Although being challenged by financial industry, their future  remains  firmly  in their  
own  hands.   
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